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Fake Polls, Real Consequences: 




For better or for worse, election polls drive the vast majority of political 
journalism and analysis.  Polls are frequently taken at face value and reported 
breathlessly, especially when they show surprising or unexpected results.  
Though most pollsters adhere to sound methodological practices, the 
dependence of political journalism – and campaigns, independent political 
organizations, and so on – on polls opens a door for the unsavory.  Fake polls 
have started to proliferate online.  Their goal is to influence online political 
betting markets, so that their purveyors can make a quick buck at the expense of 
those they’ve tricked. 
This Article argues that these actions – the creation and promulgation of 
fake polls to influence betting markets – is a classic case of either commodities 
fraud, or wire fraud, or both, or conspiracy to commit either.  It argues that 
publishing fake polls, even for the relatively esoteric purpose of influencing 
political prediction markets, could have adverse societal consequences if left 
unpunished.  Accordingly, it makes the case for criminal liability and provides 
federal prosecutors with a roadmap of how to see it through.  
  
 
* Law Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 2019–20.  The 
author thanks Professor Morgan Cloud for his editorial insights and encouragement of 
this piece; Richada Ky for her patience, support, and love throughout my fixation on 
research projects like this one; and both the online community at DailyKos Elections 
and the denizens of “Election Twitter,” especially Kevin Keelty Gartland and David 
Nir, for their constant inspiration, education, and indulgence.  And a special note of 
appreciation to the staff of the Missouri Law Review who worked on this piece – Emily 
Holtzman, Michael Essma, Brittany Briggs, and Carleigh Cavender – for their hard 
work and dedication in improving this Article. 
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  INTRODUCTION  
Suppose that someone is an investor in one of America’s most profitable 
novelty weathervane manufacturers.  The company is doing well, but the 
investor wants to drive up the value of her shares, so she crafts a clever 
scheme.  Using her business acumen, she generates a devastating, but entirely 
fraudulent, earnings report for the company’s biggest competitor and posts a 
link to the report on Twitter – from a Twitter account she created that purports 
to be a legitimate financial news outlet.  The news goes viral, the competitor’s 
stock dips, the investor’s company sees a slight increase in its price, and she 
sells her shares for a nice profit.1 
The conclusion that the investor’s actions – a sort-of reverse “pump and 
dump”2 or a “distort and short”3 – would violate federal (and probably state4) 
 
 1. This is roughly a condensed description of minor subplot in the much-awaited 
sequel to Wall Street. See generally WALL STREET: MONEY NEVER SLEEPS (20th 
Century Fox 2010) (in which Shia LeBeouf’s character spreads false rumors that an 
African government will soon nationalize its oil industry in an effort to kill the stock 
price of a rival investment firm). 
 2. “The pump-and-dump scheme generally operates by a manipulating party 
acquiring a position in a financial instrument, like a stock, then artificially inflating 
the stock through fraudulent promotion before selling its position to unsuspecting 
parties at the inflated price, which often crashes after the sale. . . . [M]odern variations 
of pump-and-dump schemes involve the use of boiler rooms, Internet chat rooms, 
fraudulent websites, social media, and spam e-mails to artificially inflate securities as 
part of the manipulative scheme.” Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 
EMORY L.J. 1253, 1284–85 (2017). 
 3. “In a distort and short campaign, short sellers and their confederates 
promulgate a number of misleading or even fraudulent press releases containing 
negative news about a company and its prospects.  They then attempt, through short 
selling, to accelerate declines in the company’s share price first caused by the 
dissemination of negative news.” Douglas M. Branson, More Muscle Behind 
Regulation SHO? Short Selling and the Regulation of Stock Borrowing Programs, 5 
VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 12 n.38 (2010); see also Christopher Cox, What the SEC Really 
Did on Short Selling, Opinion, WALL STREET J. (July 24, 2008, 12:01 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB121685865187779279 [perma.cc/LCA5-CSPB]. 
 4. Notwithstanding, of course, federal preemption of state securities law actions. 
See generally Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption 
of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1998).  “The 
Uniform Securities Act is in effect in forty states,” which includes a “verbatim copy 
of SEC Rule 10b-5 . . . . The obvious consequence is that a plaintiff or prosecutor 
could bring . . . a securities law claim and have behind her the force of a statutory 
enactment, not merely the rule of an administrative agency.” Douglas M. Branson, 
Choosing the Appropriate Default Rule – Insider Trading Under State Laws, 45 ALA. 
L. REV. 753, 771–72 (1994). 
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law would be uncontroversial.5  But how would this conclusion differ if, 
instead of generating a false earnings report in an attempt to drive down a 
company’s stock price, the investor generated a fake poll in an attempt to drive 
down a political candidate’s “stock price” on an online betting market for 
elections? 
PredictIt is a prediction market – officially a “not-for-profit market for 
event contracts” – operated by the Victory University of Wellington in New 
Zealand.6  It allows its users to bet on a number of different political events7 
– like the outcome of elections, the successful passage of legislation in 
Congress, the possibility of action by federal agencies, the odds of certain 
political actors being criminally prosecuted, and so on.  But unlike virtually 
every other political prediction market, PredictIt is legal.8  It received a no-
action letter from the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(“CFTC”) in 2014, which authorized its operation with a handful of 
restrictions. 9  PredictIt is, at least ostensibly, “operated for academic research 
 
 5. E.g., United States v. Skelly, 442 F.3d 94, 97–99 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming 
conviction of defendant for illegal pump-and-dump scheme as a violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1343, 1346 (2018) (wire fraud statutes) and SEC Rule 10b-5). 
 6. Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Staff 
Provides No-Action Relief for Victory University of Wellington, New Zealand, to 
Operate a Not-For-Profit Market for Event Contracts and to Offer Event Contracts to 
U.S. Persons (Oct. 29, 2014), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/
pr7047-14 [perma.cc/4PFJ-76LJ]. This determination is introduced here in passing but 
will be discussed much more comprehensively later. Infra Part II.A.3. 
 7. Husna Haq, Why Is It Now Legal to Gamble on the 2016 Elections?, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/Politics/2015/1008/Why-is-it-now-legal-to-gamble-on-the-2016-elections 
[perma.cc/DSJ4-AYH3]; Joe Perticone, There’s a ‘Stock Market for Politics’ Where 
Users Can Make Money on Washington’s Chaos, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 17, 2018, 
7:41 am), https://www.businessinsider.com/predictit-is-a-stock-market-for-politics-
where-users-can-make-money-2018-5 [perma.cc/A8QB-9JWN]. 
 8. Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, supra note 6; see also, 
e.g., Jessica Contrera, Here’s How to Legally Gamble on the 2016 Race, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/heres-how-to-
legally-gamble-on-the-2016-race/2016/03/28/14397dde-f1dc-11e5-85a6-
2132cf446d0a_story.html?utm_term=.ffa2a8e40f14 [perma.cc/2HQT-DZS2]; Haq, 
supra note 7.  Though PredictIt is the most prominent political prediction market 
operating today, it is certainly not the only one.  For example, the Iowa Electronic 
Markets, run by the University of Iowa, was created in the early 1990s as the first 
mainstream political market and is still operated today. See infra note 39 and 
accompanying text.  Betfair, an online gambling site, has expanded to include political 
prediction markets for American and European elections. US Politics, BETFAIR, 
https://betting.betfair.com/politics/us-politics/ [perma.cc/BM6M-XTEX] (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2019).  Other markets, like Augur, have developed as prediction markets 
built with blockchain technology. See Frequently Asked Questions, AUGUR, 
https://www.augur.net/faq [perma.cc/KDG3-VU8P] (last visited Sept. 24, 2019). 
 9. A “no-action letter” is “[a] letter from the staff of a governmental agency 
stating that if the facts are as represented in a person’s request for an agency ruling, 
the staff will advise the agency not to take action against the person.” No-Action 
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purposes only,” and its “main objective . . . is to determine whether it can 
aggregate information and predict outcomes of certain events,” like elections, 
“more accurately than through alternative means, such as public opinion 
polling.”10  Bettors on PredictIt rely on inside information, current events, and 
opinion polls (both publicly released and internal) in making their 
investments.11 
Given the heavy reliance of PredictIt bettors on public opinion polls, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that some unscrupulous actors decided to publish fake 
polls,12 likely in an effort to distort PredictIt’s market.13  This was first 
reported in July 2017 when Delphi Analytica released a poll of the U.S. Senate 
election taking place in Michigan in 2018.14  The poll showed musician Kid 
Rock, who was tested as the Republican nominee, leading Democratic Senator 
Debbie Stabenow 30% to 26% and received a great deal of media attention 
and hand-wringing over Stabenow’s election prospects.15  Notably, the share 
 
Letter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2008).  Here, the CFTC’s Division of 
Market Oversight’s letter stated that it “will not recommend that the [CFTC] take any 
enforcement action in connection with the operation of [the University’s] proposed 
market for event contracts based upon the operators’ not seeking designation as a 
contract market, registering under the Act[,] or otherwise complying with the Act or 
Commission regulations,” but “[did] not render any opinion as to whether the 
operation of [the] proposed market for event contracts violates any state law 
provisions . . . .” Letter from Vincent McGonagle, Director of Market Oversight, U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, to Neil Quigley, Deputy Vice-Chancellor, 
Research, Victoria University of Wellington (Oct. 29, 2014), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrlettergeneral/
documents/letter/14-130.pdf [perma.cc/C3ZU-ZGD8]; see also Press Release, 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, supra note 6. 
 10. Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, supra note 6. 
 11. See Harry Enten, Fake Polls Are a Real Problem, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 
22, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/fake-polls-are-a-real-problem/ 
[perma.cc/ZA7X-KGV2]; Perticone, supra note 7. 
 12. As used in this Article, a “fake poll” refers to falsified opinion polling that 
presents itself as legitimate by a fraudulent “polling outlet” – fake polls are “fake” 
because they were never conducted in the first place, and their entire existence is a 
work of fiction. Enten, supra note 11.  “Fake polls” identified herein are 
fundamentally different than the “fake polls” about which Donald Trump frequently 
complains. See, e.g., Tamara Keith, How Trump Tries to Discredit What He Doesn’t 
Like With ‘Fake’ And ‘Phony’ Labels, NPR (Aug. 31, 2018, 4:29 pm), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/08/31/643798637/how-trump-tries-to-discredit-what-he-
doesnt-like-with-fake-and-phony-labels [perma.cc/UF%L-XVCX]. 
 13. Enten, supra note 11. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See, e.g., Early Polling Strong for Bawitdaba Da Bang a Dang, NAT’L 
REVIEW (July 27, 2017, 1:16 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/early-
polling-strong-bawitdaba-da-bang-dang/ [perma.cc/UV83-LELP]. 
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price of Stabenow “stock” initially dropped on PredictIt from 78 cents to 63 
cents, and ended at 70 cents for the day16 – a fairly  significant response to a 
single event.  
However, when Harry Enten – an analyst with Nate Silver’s 
FiveThirtyEight – reviewed the poll, he concluded that “something didn’t 
smell right about it” and that it “may not have been conducted.”17  Enten 
pointed out that the lack of specifics about the poll’s methodology,18 the total 
anonymity of the polling firm’s leadership, and contemporaneous remarks in 
chatroom by the person apparently responsible for promulgating the poll all 
suggested that the poll wasn’t actually conducted.19  If Delphi Analytica didn’t 
actually conduct its Michigan poll – as seems likely – it definitely wasn’t 
alone.  Other outfits operating under a similar haze published polls in at least 
six other elections in five other states.20 
While the long-term effect of the Michigan poll was virtually 
undetectable – Kid Rock decided not to run for the Senate and Senator 
Stabenow easily won re-election over someone who likely never ate a grit 
sandwich for breakfast21 – the long-term effects of other fake polls might not 
be so easily dismissed.  Polls are usually seen as reflections of public thought, 
but they do more than reflect public opinion – they refract it, too.22  As this 
Article explains later, this refraction has real-world political effects, like 
allowing candidates to participate in debates, helping (or hurting) campaigns’ 
fundraising efforts, affecting turnout (positively or negatively), and even 
impacting election results.23  Fake polls, therefore, have far more serious 
harms than manipulating small-dollar political prediction markets – in the 
wrong hands, they could chip away at the integrity of our democracy. 
Therefore, like Wall Street, The Wolf of Wall Street, or any other good 
movie about securities fraud, the story of fake polls and their impact on 
PredictIt markets – and elections themselves – deserves a satisfying 
conclusion, with comeuppance for the fraudsters.  This Article argues that, in 
the denouement of this story, federal criminal liability should come to bear on 
the creators and purveyors of fake polls.  It provides a detailed overview of 
fake polls and identifies several theories of criminal liability for publication 
 
 16. Enten, supra note 11. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Proper disclosure of methodology generally includes reporting the sample 
size, the calculated error rate, the date range during which the poll was conducted, and 
the phrasing of the questions. Id.; see generally Assessing Public Opinion Polls, 
CONST. RTS. FOUND., http://www.crf-usa.org/election-central/public-opinion-
polls.html [perma.cc/9CCD-5R9B] (last visited Mar. 2, 2019); Leighton Walter Kille, 
Polling Fundamentals and Concepts: An Overview for Journalists, JOURNALIST’S 
RES. (Nov. 10, 2016), https://journalistsresource.org/tip-sheets/reporting/polling-
fundamentals-journalists/ [perma.cc/E98U-RYYB]. 
 19. Enten, supra note 11. 
 20. Infra notes 81–100 and accompanying text. 
 21. See generally Kid Rock, Grits Sandwiches for Breakfast (Jive Records 1990). 
 22. Infra notes 325–40 and accompanying text. 
 23. Infra notes 328–344 and accompanying text. 
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/7
2020] FAKE POLLS 135 
 
 
of fake polls.  It then argues that, regardless of which theory is utilized, the 
authors of publicized fake polls should face criminal charges. 
Part I begins by providing a more detailed explanation of how PredictIt 
operates and then addresses the origin of fake polls.  It explains – to the 
greatest extent possible given the shadowy nature of the subject matter – the 
life cycle of fake polls, from conception to publication to fallout.  Next, Part 
II addresses two different theories of criminal liability for the publishers of 
fake polls –namely, commodities fraud and wire fraud. 
Finally, Part III substantively argues that the publication of fake polls 
should be considered illegal and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.  It 
contends that fake polls could have real-world consequences, like defeating 
PredictIt’s purpose as an organization, affecting the public’s trust in polling 
companies and political journalism, altering election outcomes in close races, 
and most concerningly, opening the door to even greater foreign interference 
in American elections. 
I.  PREDICTIT, FAKE POLLS, AND ONLINE ELECTORAL 
MANIPULATION 
To understand how the publication of fake polls by rogue traders is likely 
illegal – and why it should be – it is helpful to understand how PredictIt 
operates from the user’s perspective, from start to finish.  Section A begins by 
providing a thorough, mechanical examination of PredictIt’s operations.  
Section B traces the origin of the first-reported fake polls, details the 
subsequent release of other fake polls, and puts forward evidence pointing 
towards the falsity of the polls.  It then concludes this Part by explaining how 
these fraudulent polls affect, or could affect, online betting markets. 
A.  How PredictIt Operates 
In many ways, PredictIt operates like a miniature version of a stock 
market but with a much more limited number of “stock” options, all of which 
relate to the occurrence of a political event.24  At any given time, PredictIt 
provides several hundred “markets” for users to purchase shares in.25  The 
 
 24. PredictIt generally refers to “the outcome of political and financial events and 
circumstances” as “factors.” Terms and Conditions, PREDICTIT, 
https://www.predictit.org/terms-and-conditions [perma.cc/S655-ZWLE] (last 
accessed March 2, 2019). 
 25. All Markets, PREDICTIT, https://www.predictit.org/markets 
[perma.cc/4VGH-2DEP] (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). PredictIt also allows users to 
suggest new markets. Frequently Asked Questions, PREDICTIT, 
7
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markets operate by asking a question – like, “Will Donald Trump be the 2020 
Republican nominee for President?”26 or “Who will win the 2020 Iowa 
Democratic caucuses?”27 – and then by allowing users to purchase an answer 
to the question as a “share.”28  Some of the questions present only a binary 
decision for users – they can buy “Yes” or “No” – while others allow users to 
buy one (or more) of several different options.29  The prices are set both by 
PredictIt’s market trends30 and by users themselves.31 
 
https://www.predictit.org/support/faq [perma.cc/QL9H-2X98] (last visited Mar. 2, 
2019). 
 26. Will Donald Trump Be the 2020 Republican Nominee for President?, 
PREDICTIT, https://www.predictit.org/markets/detail/3390/Will-Donald-Trump-be-
the-2020-Republican-nominee-for-president [perma.cc/VUW5-RBNP] (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2019). 
 27. Who Will Win the 2020 Iowa Democratic Caucuses?, PREDICTIT, 
https://www.predictit.org/markets/detail/5241/Who-will-win-the-2020-Iowa-
Democratic-caucuses [perma.cc/G2WM-JG5U] (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
 28. How to Trade on PredictIt, PREDICTIT, https://www.predictit.org/support/
how-to-trade-on-predictit [perma.cc/P9R8-P8QG] (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
 29. See, e.g., Will Donald Trump Be the 2020 Republican Nominee for 
President?, supra note 26; Who Will Win the 2020 Iowa Democratic Caucuses?, supra 
note 27.  For the market of who will win the 2020 Iowa Democratic causes, users can 
pick one of eight choices – Bernie Sanders, Joe Biden, Beto O’Rourke, Kamala Harris, 
Amy Klobuchar, Elizabeth Warren, Sherrod Brown, or Cory Booker. Who Will Win 
the 2020 Iowa Democratic Caucuses?, supra note 28. 
 30. See Frequently Asked Questions, PREDICTIT, supra note 25 (“[T]he price 
assigned to each potential outcome is a reflection only of the most recent trade in that 
contract . . . .”). 
 31. Id. (“PredictIt depends on traders offering prices for others to match. If you 
don’t see a price you like, name the price and quantity you’re looking for and we’ll 
register an ‘open’ offer on your behalf.”). 
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/7
2020] FAKE POLLS 137 
 
 
To purchase “shares,”32 users must create an account and deposit funds 
onto the website through PredictIt’s designated clearing house.33  The clearing 
house holds users’ deposited funds in trust in a clearing account, and it 
maintains a separate ledger for each user’s funds.34  Users purchase “shares” 
for a particular outcome – for example, predicting that Senate Candidate A 
will win her election – each of which costs less than one dollar.35  Users can 
sell their shares at any time, or they can wait until an event has been 
completed.36  If they choose not to sell, their shares will be cashed out with a 
value that depends on whether their prediction was correct.37 If it was, their 
shares will be redeemed for one dollar each; if it wasn’t, they are redeemed 
for nothing at all.38  Regardless of the user’s choice, after a sale has been 
completed, the user’s profit (after subtracting PredictIt’s 10% fee on profits) 
is deposited in trust with the clearing house.39  When a user wishes to 
withdraw funds, the clearing house subtracts PredictIt’s 5% fee on 
withdrawals and credits the user for the remainder.40  As prerequisite 
conditions for its no-action letter, the CFTC requires PredictIt to “have a limit 
of 5000 total traders in any particular [election market],” with a “limit on 
 
 32. Under both its own and the CFTC’s identification, PredictIt is a market for 
futures contracts. See Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, supra 
note 6; Letter from Vincent McGonagle to Neil Quigley, supra note 9.  Bettors are 
actually “buying and trading futures contracts linked to political or financial events or 
circumstances,” PREDICTIT, Terms and Conditions, supra note 24 (emphasis added).  
This understanding largely reflects the academic consensus for prior political event 
betting markets, like the Iowa Electronic Markets, though some commentators have 
proposed alternative classifications. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: 
Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 
1029–31 (2005); but see, e.g., Philip Robin Cleary, Note, Predicting the Taxation of 
Prediction Markets, 27 VA. TAX. REV. 953, 956, 989–90 (2008) (arguing that an 
interest in a prediction market is a “forward contract”); Andrew S. Goldberg, Note, 
Political Prediction Markets: A Better Way to Conduct Campaigns and Run 
Government, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. & POL’Y & ETHICS J. 421, 435–37 (2010) (arguing 
that an interest in a prediction market is an “excluded commodity”).  However, for 
ease of clarity and explanation, this Article uses the term “shares” in lieu of “futures 
contracts.” 
 33. Terms and Conditions, PREDICTIT, supra note 24. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Frequently Asked Questions, PREDICTIT, supra note 25.  The cost of each 
“share” “is a reflection only of the most recent trade in that contract.” Id. 
 36. Id.; Terms and Conditions, PREDICTIT, supra note 24. 
 37. Frequently Asked Questions, PREDICTIT, supra note 25; Terms and 
Conditions, PREDICTIT, supra note 24. 
 38. Frequently Asked Questions, PREDICTIT, supra note 25. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
9
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investment by any single participant in any particular [election market] of 
$850.”41  These restrictions are more generous, though similar in scope, to 
what the CFTC applied to the Iowa Electronic Markets (“IEM”), one of the 
first political prediction markets, in the 1993 no-action letter it sent to the 
IEM.42  These restrictions exist to ensure that PredictIt remains a non-profit, 
academic endeavor43 and cultivate a feel that is distinctly academic.  Pursuant 
to these requirements, PredictIt restricts the number of users and their 
investments in a single market44 – it also only allows its shares to be bought 
and sold on the website (off-website trading is expressly forbidden),45 
prohibits users from using fronts to purchase shares,46 bans “automated 
trading,”47 reserves the right to “suspend the trading of any Contract on the 
Website at any time and for any period,”48 and possesses the sole right to 
determine how a payout is structured.49  The ambience, therefore, is not 
dissimilar to a high school economics class participating in a simulated stock 
market for a grade. 
But despite the site’s restrictions, PredictIt users are effectively trading 
on a real stock market – they’re playing with real money and face real 
consequences depending on the outcome of their decisions.  PredictIt 
acknowledges this reality, which it finds essential to its academic undertaking: 
Prediction markets work best when players have some stake, however 
small, in the outcome.  With play money, many players take risks they 
wouldn’t otherwise take or don’t attend to their holdings as carefully.  
 
 41. Letter from Vincent McGonagle to Neil Quigley, supra note 9. 
 42. Letter from Andrea M. Corcoran, Director of Market Regulation, U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, to George R. Neumann, Professor of 
Economics, University of Iowa Department of Economics (June 18, 1993), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/files/foia/repfoia/foirf0503b004.pdf 
[perma.cc/H42W-83LV].  In the IEM’s Political Markets, no more than 2,000 traders 
could participate in any market “for any particular election,” and all traders were 
restricted to a maximum investment of five hundred dollars. Id. 
 43. See generally Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, supra 
note 6; Letter from Vincent McGonagle to Neil Quigley, supra note 9. 
 44. Supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 45. Terms and Conditions, PREDICTIT, supra note 24. 
 46. Id. (“By applying for a User Account, you represent, warrant, and undertake 
to us that you: . . . [b] do not already have (and will, at no time while you have the 
User Account for which you are applying, have) a User Account, whether directly or 
indirectly (including through any company or other legal entity which you directly or 
indirectly control); . . . [d] are (and will at all times be) acting solely for yourself and 
not on behalf of any other individual, company, or other legal entity . . . .”). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (“The Provider will . . . examine the Rules applicable to [a particular] 
contract and judge whether or not the Rules require a Payout and, if so, what the Actual 
Payout is; and . . . liquidate that contract . . . .  Provider may resolve a Market 
whenever, in Provider’s judgment, the conditions to decide the outcome have been 
met. The Provider’s decision . . . will be final.”). 
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Such markets may therefore have less research value than real money 
ones.  Besides, we think real money is fun too.50 
And participants are acting as though they’re trading on a real stock 
market too.  Though participation varies depending on the market in question, 
PredictIt markets attract significant participation.51  By March 2016 – less 
than two years after PredictIt was launched – it had 29,000 active traders, each 
with an average of about $120 wagered on the site.52  By 2018, the site had 
around 80,000 traders.53  Despite the investment caps and the limits on total 
traders in a given market, one researcher estimated that around $1 million was 
invested in the 2016 presidential election.54  And following PredictIt’s spike 
in interest during the 2016 election, 300 million shares in total were traded in 
2017 alone, despite the paucity of marquee elections.55  Today, the most 
popular market on PredictIt is the 2020 Democratic primary, which has seen 
over 125 million shares traded since the market began and currently has over 
28 million active shares.56 
With this robust activity in mind, it is unsurprising that fraudulent 
activity has developed.  Indeed, PredictIt seems to have predicted that fraud 
will occur.  As it notes in its Terms and Conditions, “[T]here are no controls 
on market manipulation . . . .”57 
 
 50. Frequently Asked Questions, PREDICTIT, supra note 25. 
 51. See, e.g., David Hill, The Wolves of K Street, RINGER (Mar. 21, 2018, 6:20 
AM), https://www.theringer.com/2018/3/21/17130490/predictit-politics-elections-
gambling [perma.cc/X2XH-9YHK]; Contrera, supra note 8. 
 52. Contrera, supra note 8. 
 53. Hill, supra note 51. 
 54. Philip Wallach, Op-Ed, Sick of Political Polls? Try Prediction Markets, L.A. 
TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-wallach-
prediction-markets-20160928-snap-story.html [perma.cc/Ax36-HKH5]. 
 55. Hill, supra note 51. 
 56. Who Will Win the 2020 Democratic Presidential Nomination?, PREDICTIT, 
https://www.predictit.org/markets/detail/3633/Who-will-win-the-2020-Democratic-
presidential-nomination [perma.cc/L42U-M7TZ] (last visited Mar. 27, 2020). 
 57. Terms and Conditions, PREDICTIT, supra note 24 (emphasis added). 
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B.  The Emergence of Fake Polls 
Despite some notable times when polls have missed the mark,58 modern 
polling is largely accurate, especially among top-tier pollsters.59  Accordingly, 
PredictIt bettors are well-advised to include public opinion polls in the total 
mix of information when making their betting decisions.60  So with massive 
profits potentially on the line and with a community of bettors who base their 
trading decisions (at least in part) on polls, fraudsters have likely started 
churning out fake polls to take advantage of these unsuspecting PredictIt 
bettors. 
In fairness, falsified polling is nothing new.  In late 2009, analyst Nate 
Silver suggested that Strategic Vision, an Atlanta-based public relations firm 
that dabbled in public opinion polling for conservative causes, was falsifying 
its results.61  The American Association for Public Opinion Research 
reprimanded Strategic Vision – though not because of Silver’s piece.62  
Instead, the Association was conducting a post-mortem investigation of 
polling in the 2008 Democratic presidential primary in New Hampshire, 
which incorrectly estimated that Barack Obama would win, and Strategic 
Vision declined to turn over details of its polling.63  In response, the 
Association reprimanded it for falling short of the industry’s disclosure 
requirements.64 
In early 2010, three researchers investigating polls allegedly conducted 
by Research 2000 concluded that its results were fraudulent: “[W]e are 
 
 58. See, e.g., Emily L. Mahoney, Here’s How Ron DeSantis Defied the Polls and 
Beat Andrew Gillum, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/
news/politics-government/state-politics/article221146890.html (“[Ron] DeSantis’ 
victory defied most polls that showed him trailing [Andrew] Gillum.”); Andrew 
Mercer, Claudia Deane & Kyley McGeeney, Why 2016 Election Polls Missed Their 
Mark, PEW RES. CTR.: FACTTANK (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/11/09/why-2016-election-polls-missed-their-mark/ [perma.cc/A824-
XX9W] (“Across the board, polls underestimated Trump’s level of support.”). 
 59. E.g., Scott Clement, ‘The Sky is Not Falling’: Two Major Studies Show 
Election Polls Are Not Getting Less Accurate, WASH. POST (June 1, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/06/01/the-sky-is-not-
falling-two-major-studies-show-election-polls-are-not-getting-less-
accurate/?utm_term=.0c308100b5b2 [perma.cc/Y4JT-UXPF]; Nate Silver, The Polls 
Are All Right, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 30, 2018, 11:00 AM), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-polls-are-all-right/ [perma.cc/QC5S-7Jyy]. 
 60. Supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 61. Shaila Dewan, Polling Firm’s Reprimand Rattles News Media, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 2, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/03/us/03survey.html 
[perma.cc/42JC-SAG3]; Nate Silver, Strategic Vision Polls Exhibit Unusual Patterns, 
Possibly Indicating Fraud, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 25, 2009, 1:04 PM), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/strategic-vision-polls-exhibit-unusual/ 
[perma.cc/QC2J-V58M]. 
 62. Dewan, supra note 61. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
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confident that [Research 2000’s results] could not accurately describe random 
polls.”65  The researchers shared the results of their investigation with Daily 
Kos, a progressive media outlet that had contracted with Research 2000 to 
conduct polls in a number of states in 2008 and 2010.66  Daily Kos had 
terminated its contract with Research 2000 several weeks prior, following the 
pollster’s poor evaluation from Nate Silver’s FiveThirtyEight article,67 but 
upon receiving credible allegations of fraud, it filed a federal lawsuit against 
the pollster for fraud.68  Research 2000’s President responded to the lawsuit 
with a “rambling public response” that strongly suggested falsification on his 
company’s part.69  A year later, Daily Kos and Research 2000 settled the 
lawsuit with terms that were not disclosed but with clear indications of fraud 
on Research 2000’s part.70 
In that instance, Research 2000’s alleged falsification resulted in very 
real consequences – not for online bettors but for candidates, voters, the news 
media, and third-party campaign organizations.  In Arkansas’s 2010 runoff to 
determine the Democratic nominee for the U.S. Senate, Research 2000 polls 
– which were the only public polls in the field – consistently showed 
Lieutenant Governor Bill Halter leading incumbent Senator Blanche 
Lincoln.71  The Halter campaign promoted the polls (even as they privately 
 
 65. Nate Silver, BREAKING: Daily Kos to Sue Research 2000 for Fraud, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 29, 2010, 5:40 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
breaking-daily-kos-to-sue-research-2000/ [perma.cc/93ZS-BHCD]. 
 66. Id.; Mark Grebner, Michael Weissman & Jonathan Weissman, R2K Polls: 
Problems in Plain Sight, DAILY KOS (June 29, 2010, 12:01 PM), 
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2010/06/29/880179/-Research-2000:-Problems-in-
plain-sight [perma.cc/CT3J-HP2J]; Markos Moulitsas, Polling, DAILY KOS (June 9, 
2010, 12:33 PM), https://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2010/6/9/874403/-Polling 
[perma.cc/K5AV-4VNT]. 
 67. Moulitsas, supra note 66; Silver, supra note 65. 
 68. Markos Moulitsas, More on Research 2000, DAILY KOS (June 29, 2010, 
12:01 PM), https://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2010/6/29/880185/-More-on-
Research-2000 [perma.cc/99RE-H5DD]; Kos Media, LLC et al. v. Research 2000 et 
al., No. 3:10CV02894 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2012) (this case was dismissed on July 12, 
2012). 
 69. “Yes[,] we weight heavily and I will, using [the] margin of error adjust the 
top line [results].” Mark Blumenthal, Daily Kos vs. Research 2000 Lawsuit Settled, 
HUFFPOST (May 27, 2011, 7:43 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/05/27/daily-kos-research-2000-lawsuit_n_867775.html [perma.cc/SVM2-
FNW3] (emphasis added). 
 70. Id. 
 71. David Catanese, Poll Scandal Shocks Campaigns, POLITICO (July 1, 2010, 
4:39 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2010/07/poll-scandal-shocks-campaigns-
039265?o=0 [perma.cc/Y88F-LV7Z]; Chris Good, Looking Back at Daily Kos, 
Research 2000, and Bill Halter, ATLANTIC (July 19, 2010), 
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doubted their authenticity) and used them to raise money, attract national 
attention as the “perceived frontrunner,” and convince labor unions to spend 
several million dollars supporting their campaign.72  Halter ended up losing 
the election by four points, a result that public polling missed by seven or eight 
points.73  Similarly, in California’s Republican primary for the Senate that 
same year, an incorrect Research 2000 poll that showed former Congressman 
Tom Campbell leading Carly Fiorina by fifteen points enabled the Campbell 
campaign to raise money and scrambled expectations of the race.74 
While faking polls is perhaps old news, doing it to affect the prices of 
futures contracts on an online political betting market is a very recent 
development.  The July 2017 poll allegedly conducted by Delphi Analytica, 
which infamously showed musician Kid Rock leading Senator Debbie 
Stabenow, first attracted media attention to the concept of fake polls.75  But 
outlets identified by commentators as fraudulent were publishing polls before 
the Michigan poll was widely publicized.76 
For example, Delphi Analytica published three polls in the weeks prior 
to releasing its controversial Michigan poll: an extremely early poll of the 
2020 Democratic primary,77 a poll suggesting that a plurality of Arizona 
voters wanted John McCain to resign from the Senate following his terminal 
cancer diagnosis,78 and a poll of the Republican primary for the special Senate 
election in Alabama.79  Similarly, CSP Polling – which, according to 
University of Florida political science professor Michael McDonald and Jeff 




 72. Catanese, supra note 71; Good, supra note 71. 
 73. Catanese, supra note 71; Good, supra note 71. 
 74. Catanese, supra note 71. 
 75. Enten, supra note 11. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Democrats Have a Huge Leadership Void Heading Towards the 2020 
Presidential Elections, DELPHI ANALYTICA (July 11, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@DelphiAnalytica/democrats-have-a-huge-leadership-void-
heading-towards-the-2020-presidential-elections-586a0faf7a74 [perma.cc/PZ8H-
37VT].  In the event that these releases are deleted prior to, or following, the 
publication of this Article, all three are on file with the author. 
 78. Majority of Arizonians Want McCain to Step Down Following Cancer 
Diagnosis, DELPHI ANALYTICA (July 25, 2017), https://medium.com/
@DelphiAnalytica/majority-of-arizonians-want-mccain-to-step-down-following-
cancer-diagnosis-670af8ba6c96 [perma.cc/57CR-FHKV]. 
 79. Luther Strange Slightly Ahead of Mo Brooks in 3 Way Alabama Senate Race, 
DELPHI ANALYTICA (July 23, 2017), https://medium.com/@DelphiAnalytica/luther-
strange-slightly-ahead-of-mo-brooks-in-3-way-alabama-senate-race-6bcd1671a60b 
[perma.cc/79C4-WDD3]. 
 80. Jeff Blehar (@EsotericCD), TWITTER (Mar. 2, 2018, 3:29 PM), 
https://twitter.com/EsotericCD/status/969671133871173637 [https://perma.cc/7Z5J-
U97J]; Enten, supra note 11.  In providing this anecdote, the Author acknowledges 
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it conducted polls in the 2017 special congressional election in Montana,81 the 
special congressional election in Georgia,82 and the Virginia Democratic 
primary for Governor.83  Even after being identified in FiveThirtyEight as a 
fake pollster, CSP Polling continued to release polls,84 though the seriousness 
of the poll “releases” noticeably deteriorated in the year that followed.85  
Blumenthal Research Daily (“BRD”) made its debut in March 2018, two 
weeks prior to the special election in Pennsylvania’s 18th congressional 
district.86  It released a poll in the special election showing Democrat Conor 
 
that many readers are unfamiliar with the term “cuck” and that this Article must, 
regrettably, provide an elaboration.  In this instance, “cuck” is short for “cuckold,” an 
antiquated term for a man whose wife is not faithful. Cuckhold, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cuckold 
[perma.cc/5DVV-NSK8].  The term has been adopted by the alt-right and many white 
supremacists.  Avowed white supremacist Richard Spencer is a frequent user of the 
term and declared, “It is the cuckold who, whether knowingly or unknowingly, loses 
control of his future. This is an apt psychological portrait of white ‘conservatives’ 
whose only identity is comprised of vague, abstract ‘values,’ and who are participating 
in the displacement of European Americans – their own children.” David Weigel, 
‘Cuckservative’ – The Conservative Insult of the Month, Explained, WASH. POST (July 
29, 2015, 9:055 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2015/07/29/cuckservative-the-conservative-insult-of-the-month-explained/
?utm_term=.2e84460b7eb3 [perma.cc/9KFF-9PGQ].  The Author apologizes for the 
necessity of this clarification. 
 81. @CSP_Polling, TWITTER (May 25, 2017, 6:09 PM), https://twitter.com/
CSP_Polling/status/867910603167289344 [perma.cc/45Rl-FV62] (“Final prediction: 
Greg Gianforte will win MT Special Election, 50.1% to 46.35%.”).  In the event that 
CSP Polling’s tweets are deleted, screenshots remain on file with the author. 
 82. @CSP_Polling, TWITTER (June 18, 2017, 10:46 AM), https://twitter.com/
CSP_Polling/status/876496380100984832 [perma.cc/A4WM-3R8J] (“Our final GA-
6 poll: Handel 49, Ossoff 48, GA-6 election too close to call!”). 
 83. Enten, supra note 11. 
 84. E.g., @CSP_Polling, TWITTER (Nov. 13, 2017, 4:33 PM), https://twitter.com/
CSP_Polling/status/930232257406648320 [perma.cc/X5FN-ZLLC] (“We find [Roy 
Moore] leading [Doug Jones] in the Alabama Senate election by 4 points, 49-45, in 
our #ALSen poll. 6% undecided.”). 
 85. See, e.g., @CSP_Polling, TWITTER (Nov. 12, 2018, 10:18 PM), 
https://twitter.com/CSP_Polling/status/1062228172006133760 [perma.cc/2JGE-
L2WE] (“Just completed our poll in [M]ississippi. [T]hat one republican chick: 58. 
[T]hat one dem dude: 39[.]”). 
 86. Karlyn Bowman, The Trouble with Polling, NAT’L AFFAIRS (Summer 2018), 
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-trouble-with-polling 
[https://perma.cc/N9QC-8JHG]; Ryan Deto, Beware of a Fake Poll Circulating About 
the Special Election for Pennsylvania’s 18th Congressional District, PITTSBURGH 
CITY PAPER (Mar. 5, 2018, 3:24 PM), https://www.pghcitypaper.com/
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Lamb leading Republican Rick Saccone by one point, but just three hours 
later, Timothy Blumenthal, the apparent founder of BRD, disavowed it.87  
Blumenthal acknowledged that BRD was a “fake pollster,” that the “numbers 
used were random,” and that he did “little to no research before piecing 
together a rather sloppy google doc.”88  He claimed that it was “an obvious 
troll” attempt that “almost nobody” fell for.89  However, despite Blumenthal’s 
disavowal and BRD’s known identity as a fake pollster, BRD seemed to 
pretend that Blumenthal never actually came clean.  Blumenthal’s statement 
was quickly deleted from Twitter,90 and BRD’s website is inactive.  And just 
hours after tweeting out Blumenthal’s statement, BRD tweeted, “We do not 
need to prove ourselves to anyone.  Our poll will speak for itself on March 
13.”91  Several days later, another organization presenting itself as a polling 
company, KG Polling – which was apparently run by the same people behind 
BRD and CSP92 – released a poll of the special election, showing Lamb ahead 
of Saccone by four points.93 
Following the election – which saw Lamb win by one point, as BRD 
“predicted” – it continued the act and congratulated itself as “the most 
accurate pollster” in the race.94  And like CSP Polling, BRD continued to 
“conduct” “polling” – of the 2018 Illinois Democratic primary for Governor,95 
the special election in Arizona’s 8th congressional district,96 and the North 
Dakota Senate election.97 Though these fraudulent pollsters largely fell 




 87. Deto, supra note 86. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Bowman, supra note 86. 
 90. Deto, supra note 86. 
 91. @BRD_Polling, TWITTER (Mar. 2, 2018, 11:44 AM), https://twitter.com/
brd_polling/status/969659837863940096 [perma.cc/4P23-74RN]. 
 92. G. Elliott Morris (@gelliotmorris), TWITTER (Mar. 11, 2018, 1:30 PM), 
https://twitter.com/gelliottmorris/status/972887501332533248 [perma.cc/YZC5-
MU4X] (Morris is a political journalist for The Economist.) 
 93. Pennsylvania 18 Special Election Poll 3/10/18, KG POLLING (Mar. 10, 2018), 
https://kgpolling.wordpress.com/2018/03/10/pennsylvania-18-special-election-poll-
3-10-18/ [perma.cc/Y9YR-JKK4] (last visited Jan. 23, 2020) 
 94. @BRD_Polling, TWITTER (Mar. 14, 2018, 4:49 AM), 
https://twitter.com/brd_polling/status/973888769958010880 [perma.cc/HWD9-
US5U] (“We were the first poll to have Lamb winning. We were called fake news, 
mocked and laughed at. Not only were we the first to predict the correct outcome, but 
we were by far the most accurate pollster of the #pa18 race.”). 
 95. @BRD_Polling, TWITTER (Mar. 19, 2018, 5:53 PM), https://twitter.com/
brd_polling/status/975867970403684353 [perma.cc/4HPL-MQ6A]. 
 96. @BRD_Polling, TWITTER (Apr. 17, 2018, 12:07 PM), https://twitter.com/
brd_polling/status/986289949904461838 [perma.cc/W2HV-E75Q]. 
 97. @BRD_Polling, TWITTER (Oct. 5, 2018, 12:28 PM), https://twitter.com/
brd_polling/status/1048263613792903168 [perma.cc/7ZPZ-N4DA]. 
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2020 Democratic caucus in Iowa, showing Bernie well ahead of his opponents 
with 31% of the vote, while Pete Buttigieg, who led in most polls at the time,98 
was in fourth place with 12%.99 
The motive for releasing these “polls” – which almost assuredly were 
not actually conducted – is suspect according to many political commentators 
who have followed their development.100  Professor Michael McDonald 
started following furtive conversations taking place on Discord, a chatroom 
application used by many Trump supporters and alt-right activists,101 where 
the users were talking about political developments and online betting 
markets.102  After following these conversations – in which some users were 
bragging about the Delphi Analytica poll, including the alleged founder of the 
“polling” agency – McDonald concluded that the users had two goals.103  “The 
first: to gain notoriety and troll the press and political observers. . . . The 
second: to move the betting markets,” by tricking PredictIt users to bet on a 
certain outcome – like Kid Rock winning the Senate election – and shorting 
that position.104 
There may be no direct proof of this assertion – Delphi Analytica denies 
that its poll was falsified to affect online betting markets105 – but some 
circumstantial evidence certainly supports it.  As Harry Enten of 
FiveThirtyEight pointed out, “[S]hares of the stock for Michigan’s 2018 
Senate race saw their biggest action of the year by far the day after Delphi 
 
 98. See, e.g., Who’s Ahead in Iowa?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (last visited Jan. 23, 
2020), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/polls/president-primary-d/iowa/ 
[perma.cc/C78U-P48B]. 
 99. @KGPolling, TWITTER (Dec. 31, 2019, 8:43 PM), 
https://twitter.com/KGPolling/status/1212187475617210368 [perma.cc/W5RG-
KBW3].  
 100. Jeff Blehar (@EsotericCD), TWITTER (Mar. 2, 2018, 3:17 PM), 
https://twitter.com/esotericcd/status/969668115817750529?lang=bg 
[perma.cc/JVR3-UEBS] (“Just so you know, [Blumenthal Research Daily] (the outfit 
with that supposed PA-18 poll) comes from the same group of scammers that released 
fake polls in GA-6 and AL-SEN.  The goal is to move prediction markets using fake 
polls for profit”); Enten, supra note 11. 
 101. Samantha Cole, Pro-Trump Discord Server ‘Centipede Central’ Says It’s 
Being Monitored, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Aug. 14, 2017, 6:40 PM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/zmmxje/pro-trump-discord-server-
centipede-central-says-its-being-monitored [perma.cc/FX4M-7GQ8]. 
 102. Enten, supra note 11. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  Technically, because PredictIt doesn’t allow shorting, the comparable 
action in a market with a binary option would be to invest in the opposing candidate’s 
shares, which would have the same practical effect as shorting a stock in a PredictIt 
market. 
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Analytica published its survey,” increasing from less than 100 trades per day 
just the day before to nearly 3,000 the day after the poll was published.106  
Further, the polls published by the outlets mentioned above – Delphi 
Analytica, CSP Polling, and Blumenthal Research Daily – tended to feature 
results that were quite divergent from the general political consensus at the 
time. 
The Delphi Analytica poll provides an obvious starting point.  
Suggesting that Kid Rock – a B-list musician with little history of advocacy 
before 2016107 – would have a four-point lead over a well-liked politician 
before he had even entered the race strained credulity.  A poll released around 
the same time by Target-Insyght, a more reliable pollster,108 showed Senator 
Stabenow leading Kid Rock by eight points.109  But Target-Insyght’s much 
less flashy poll received significantly less media attention than the Delphi 
Analytica “poll” and had no discernible impact on PredictIt’s trades.110  
One of Delphi Analytica’s other polls provides a similar point of 
reference: Its “poll” of the Republican primary in Alabama’s special Senate, 
released on July 23, 2017, showed incumbent Senator Luther Strange with 
29% of the vote, Congressman Mo Brooks with 25%, and former State 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy Moore with 24%.111  This prediction wildly 
differed from every other poll conducted in a similar timeframe, nearly all of 
which showed Strange and Moore in first or second place with Brooks much 
further behind.112  This estimate, which was released several weeks prior to 
the primary, looks even more suspicious in light of the election’s actual results 
in which Moore received 40%, Strange received 32%, and Brooks received 
20%.113 In October 2018, after several months of silence, BRD published a 
 
 106. Id. (emphasis added). 
 107. See Amanda Petrusich, Kid Rock’s Senate Run is a Terrifying New Normal, 
NEW YORKER (July 13, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/kid-
rocks-senate-run-is-a-terrifying-new-normal [perma.cc/KW32-HPB4]. 
 108. FiveThirtyEight’s Pollster Ratings, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 30, 2018, 11:00 
AM), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/pollster-ratings/ [perma.cc/TT6X-XPVG]. 
Per FiveThirtyEight’s metrics, Target-Insyght received a “C” grade, which, while not 
great, beats a fake poll. Id. 
 109. Jonathan Oosting, Poll: Kid Rock Trails Stabenow 50–42% in Senate Race, 
DETROIT NEWS (July 31, 2017, 6:48 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/
story/news/politics/2017/07/31/poll-kid-rock-trails-stabenow/104176822/ 
[perma.cc/W373-6XPF]. 
 110. See Enten, supra note 11. 
 111. DELPHI ANALYTICA, Luther Strange Slightly Ahead of Mo Brooks in 3 Way 
Alabama Senate Race, supra note 79. 
 112. See Alabama Senate Special Election – Republican Primary, REALCLEAR 
POLITICS (last visited March 3, 2019), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/
epolls/2017/senate/al/alabama_senate_special_election_republican_primary-
6220.html#polls [perma.cc/2NBJ-QXS9]. 
 113. See David Weigel, Sen. Luther Strange Will Face Jurist Roy Moore in 
Alabama’s Republican Senate Runoff, WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/as-polls-open-in-alabama-senate-race-
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“poll” of the Senate race in North Dakota, showing incumbent Democratic 
Senator Heidi Heitkamp leading her Republican opponent, Congressman 
Kevin Cramer, by 52% to 46%.114  This estimate was wildly at odds with what 
other polls were showing and with what prognosticators were predicting.  
Heitkamp had not led in any publicly released poll in the preceding six 
months,115 both parties indicated that their private polling had Heitkamp 
losing,116 and most independent election raters had moved the race to “Leans 
Republican.”117  In the end, Cramer ended up defeating Heitkamp by eleven 
points,118 making BRD’s estimate off by seventeen points. 
CSP Polling and Blumenthal Research Daily published two polls that, 
though they ultimately ended up very close to the final margins, confounded 
expectations at the time.  For example, CSP Polling’s “poll” of the special 
election in Georgia’s 6th congressional district, released on June 18, 2017, 
showed Republican Karen Handel with a one-point lead over Democrat Jon 
Ossoff.119  At the time, this was the first poll released in a month and a half 
showing Handel with a lead over Ossoff.120  Similarly, BRD’s poll of the 




 114. @BRD_POLLING, (Apr. 17, 2018, 12:07 PM), supra note 96. 
 115. Janie Velencia & Dhrumil Mehta, Can Heitkamp Pull Off a Second Upset in 
North Dakota?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 12, 2018, 5:59 AM), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/can-heitkamp-pull-off-a-second-upset-in-north-
dakota/ [perma.cc/4AY5-ETYA]. 
 116. Burgess Everett, GOP Closes in on Heitkamp Knockout – and Control of the 
Senate, POLITICO (Oct. 11, 2018, 5:08 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2018/10/11/heidi-heitkamp-north-dakota-senate-2018-891461 [perma.cc/Y4LD-
3RC4]. 
 117. E.g., Jennifer E. Duffy, North Dakota Senate: Race Moves to Lean 
Republican, COOK POLITICAL REPORT (Oct. 19, 2018), https://cookpolitical.com/
analysis/senate/north-dakota-senate/north-dakota-senate-race-moves-lean-republican 
[perma.cc/8XYA-JLYW]. 
 118. North Dakota Election Results, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2019, 10:38 AM), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/06/us/elections/results-north-dakota-
elections.html [perma.cc/KBB6-XBEW]. 
 119. @CSP_POLLING, (June 18, 2017, 10:46 AM), supra note 82. 
 120. Georgia 6th District Run-Off Election – Handel v. Ossoff, REALCLEAR 
POLITICS (last visited Mar. 3, 2019), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/
2017/house/ga/georgia_6th_district_runoff_election_handel_vs_ossoff-
6202.html#polls [perma.cc/68TS-YJHR]; Jeff Stein, Where the Polls Stand 2 Days 
Before Georgia’s Special Election, VOX (June 18, 2017, 10:20 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/6/18/15825944/special-election-
ossoff-handel [perma.cc/D7CF-FGFD] (“Polling over the last three weeks suggests 
Ossoff has a narrow but potentially shrinking lead over Handel . . . .”). 
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Democrat Conor Lamb beating Republican Rick Saccone by one point.121  
BRD’s “poll” was indeed the first publicly released estimate to put Lamb 
ahead of Saccone,122 as all other polls released until that point had put Saccone 
ahead, albeit by a decreasing margin.123  Given that Lamb narrowly defeated 
Saccone by one point, the few polls putting Lamb ahead were accurate124 but 
still confounded expectations.125 
The point here isn’t to suggest that these polls were bad or inaccurate.  
Though some of them certainly were significantly off,126 in hindsight, others 
ended up being quite accurate.127  It is instead to suggest that these polls 
showed results that were unbelievable or otherwise out-of-line with either 
expectations for the election or the eventual results.  Most pollsters have the 
exact opposite inclination: When they get a result that seems out of place, they 
decline to release it128 or they rebalance the results so that their poll fits the 
norm.129  Though documented reports of pollsters junking their own polls are 
scant, they do happen.  Most prominently and most recently, a pollster 
 
 121. Deto, supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 122. @BRD_POLLING, (Mar. 14, 2018, 4:49 AM), supra note 94. 
 123. Pennsylvania 18th District Special Election - Saccone v. Lamb, REALCLEAR 
POLITICS (last accessed Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2018/
house/pa/pennsylvania_18th_district_special_election_saccone_vs_lamb-6327.
html#polls [perma.cc/7SCM-YD83]. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Alex Isenstadt, Republicans Trash Their Candidate in Pa. Special 
Election, POLITICO (Mar. 7, 2018, 6:25 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/
03/07/republicans-pennsylvania-special-election-445221 [perma.cc/TH4B-FEHA] 
(noting that the special election was taking place in a Republican-favored district that 
Donald Trump “won by 20 percentage points” 
 126. Supra notes 107–117 and accompanying text. 
 127. Supra notes 119–125 and accompanying text. 
 128. E.g., Tal Kopan, PPP Reveals It Held Colo. Poll, POLITICO (Sept. 11, 2013), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/ppp-colorado-poll-096628 
[perma.cc/H3QW-BY4U].  In this case, Public Policy Polling conducted polls of a 
State Senate recall election in Pueblo, Colorado, and decided not to release the results. 
Id.  Following the unexpected recalls of State Senators Angela Giron and John Morse, 
the head of PPP disclosed that the firm had polled the races and had accurately 
predicted the outcome. Id.   
We did a poll last weekend in Colorado Senate District 3 and found that 
voters intended to recall Angela Giron by a 12 point margin, 54/42. In a 
district that Barack Obama won by almost 20 points I figured there was 
no way that could be right and made a rare decision not to release the poll. 
It turns out we should have had more faith in our numbers. 
Id. 
 129. Nate Silver, Here’s Proof Some Pollsters Are Putting a Thumb on the Scale, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 14, 2014, 1:58 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/
features/heres-proof-some-pollsters-are-putting-a-thumb-on-the-scale/ 
[perma.cc/4KJ7-9EZU].  This process is known as “herding,” or “the tendency of 
polling firms to produce results that closely match one another, especially toward the 
end of a campaign.” Id. 
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publicly admitted that it declined to release a poll of the 2019 Australian 
federal election that predicted the incumbent Coalition government would win 
re-election.130  The poll ended up being correct, but it contradicted virtually 
every other publicly released poll, so the polling agency’s chief executive 
decided not to publish it: “No one wants to release a poll that is wildly out of 
step.”131  
A poll that challenges a status quo assumption, whether correct or 
incorrect in the end, tends to disrupt expectations.132  It is no surprise, then, 
that in the aftermath of the Delphi Analytica poll, trading on the Michigan 
Senate race exploded on PredictIt, Debbie Stabenow’s “stock” price went 
down, and the Republican nominee’s “stock” surged.133  This reflects, 
generally speaking, how Wall Street traders respond to new information, like 
a change in a credit rating for a particular company134 or an earnings report.135 
Therefore, the content of the “polls” themselves provides some support 
for the assertion that they were fraudulent and were published to affect online 
betting markets.  Regardless of their accuracy, the vast majority of them 
contradicted publicly available data and expectations.  This contradiction 
would make sense if the publisher’s goal was to affect stock prices.  If a 
bettor’s goal is to make money by shorting a candidate’s “stock price” on 
PredictIt,136 they could efficiently do so by identifying a candidate widely 
perceived as a favorite and releasing a fraudulent poll showing that candidate 
either losing or being in an unexpectedly close race.  Given the speed with 
 
 130. Michael Koziol, ‘Embarrassed’ Pollster Ripped Up Poll That Showed Labor 
Losing Election, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (June 9, 2019, 12:00 AM EST), 
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/embarrassed-pollster-ripped-up-poll-that-
showed-labor-losing-election-20190604-p51u9v.html [perma.cc/Z88R-WXJT]. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text. 
 133. Enten, supra note 11; see also supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 134. See generally John Hand et al., The Effect of Bond Rating Agency 
Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices, 47 J. FIN. 733 (1992). 
 135. See generally Anne E. Chambers & Stephen H. Penman, Timeliness of 
Reporting and the Stock Price Reaction to Earnings Announcements, 22 J. ACCT. RES. 
21 (1984).  Indeed, PredictIt assumes that their traders will behave this way.  In its 
“Frequently Asked Questions,” PredictIt answers the question, “When is it a good idea 
to buy or to sell?” by noting in part, “You could consider selling your shares if the 
price moves towards what you think is the right probability, or if events cause you to 
reconsider your judgment of the right price.” PREDICTIT, Frequently Asked Questions, 
supra note 25 (emphasis added). 
 136. Supra note 105 (noting that, while PredictIt doesn’t allow shorting as a 
technical matter, shorting can nonetheless occur in a binary market if a better 
purchases an event contract for the other candidate). 
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which political news – and shocking polls, in particular – travels on Twitter,137 
the fake poll could convince innocent PredictIt bettors to buy or sell shares, 
which would affect the overall stock price.138  As explained in the 
introduction, this is exactly what happened to share prices in the Michigan 
Senate race.139 
Assuming that the intent of the authors of these fake polls is to 
manipulate PredictIt markets – and assuming that the polls are, in fact, fake – 
the question then naturally arises: What crimes, if any, have they committed? 
Part II endeavors to answer that question. 
II.  THE AVENUES FOR CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
This Part proceeds on the critical and necessary assumption that 
fraudsters are creating and publishing fake polls with the intent to affect share 
prices on an online political betting market.140  As explained in Part I, this 
allegation is certainly possible – if not probable – and it is with this in mind 
that Part II addresses potential criminal liability for this conduct. 
The two likeliest theories of criminal liability – commodities fraud and 
wire fraud – are addressed in Sections A and B, respectively.  Both sections 
outline the requirements that any federal prosecutor would face in filing 
charges for commodities fraud and wire fraud and then argue that the conduct 
described in Part I satisfies those requirements. 
A.  Commodities Fraud 
This Subpart focuses on the possibility that commodities fraud liability 
can attach to the creation and publication of a fake poll to influence political 
prediction markets.  It begins by reviewing the relevant history of 
commodities fraud – which has undergone monumental change in the near-
century since its inception – before outlining the elements of commodities 
fraud.  Finally, this Subpart applies the elements of the crime and concludes 
that they are likely satisfied. 
 
 137. See Deto, supra note 86 (discussing the quick spread of BRD’s poll of the 
Pennsylvania special election, despite the low number of Twitter users following 
BRD’s account). 
 138. See Frequently Asked Questions, PREDICTIT, supra note 25  (“[T]he price 
assigned to each potential outcome is a reflection only of the most recent trade in that 
contract . . . .”). 
 139. Supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 140. This Article makes such an assumption not to paper over the conduct at issue, 
but instead to recognize that further investigation, combined with the inevitable 
discovery that would take place in civil or criminal litigation, would authoritatively 
confirm or deny this characterization of the available facts. 
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1.  Development of Commodities Fraud 
The seed of commodities fraud was first planted by the Grain Futures 
Act, which sought to prevent “false or misleading or knowingly inaccurate 
reports concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend 
to affect the price of grain in interstate commerce.”141  Though a federal statute 
– currently codified as 7 U.S.C. § 9 – that initially regulated against 
manipulation of agricultural markets seems an unlikely hero in the battle 
against fake polls, the Grain Futures Act was soon replaced by the Commodity 
Exchange Act (“CEA”) in 1936.142  As the law evolved, the definition of 
“commodity” expanded from solely agricultural products, as initially defined 
in the Grain Futures Act143 and Commodity Exchange Act,144 to include “all 
other goods and articles . . . and all services, rights, and interests . . . in which 
contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.”145  
In safeguarding these interests, the CEA, as first adopted, meant to 
“protect[] commodity futures trading on exchanges from ‘speculation, 
manipulation or control.’”146  But preventing “manipulation” proved easier 
said than done.  Until the passage of Dodd-Frank in 2010, commodities fraud 
was difficult for the CFTC to pursue.147  This difficulty was borne largely by 
the fact that the CEA, unlike the Securities Exchange Act, contained only 
“general anti-manipulation provisions” and lacked any explicit prohibition of 
fraud.148  At that time, “no statute, regulation, or case define[d] manipulation” 
 
 141. Grain Futures Act, Pub. L. No. 67-331, 42 Stat. 998 (1922); see also Kevin 
T. Van Wart, Preemption and the Commodity Exchange Act, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
657, 666 (1982). 
 142. Grain Futures Act, Pub. L. No. 67-331, 42 Stat. 998 (1922). 
 143. Supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) 
(current version at 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2018)). 
 145. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2018). 
 146. Walter Bachrach, The Cloverleaf Case, and Suspension of State Gambling 
Statutes as Applied to Commodity Futures Transactions, 7 J. MARSHALL L.Q. 457, 
461 (quoting Commodity Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936)).  
Still, in the CEA, “commodity” is defined as “wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, 
rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs and Solanum tuberosum (Irish 
potatoes).” Commodity Exchange Act § 3(a). 
 147. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Revolution in Manipulation Law: The New 
CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical Analyses, 15 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 357, 362–66 (2013); see generally Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market 
Manipulation Law: A (Very) Critical Analysis and a Proposed Alternative, 51 WASH 
& LEE L. REV. 945 (1994). 
 148. Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 215, 253–54 
(2015). 
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for the purposes of the Act, leading to a “grab bag of accounts of 
manipulation” crafted by administrative and judicial opinions.149  This led to 
the development of “extraordinarily confused” caselaw, which was frequently 
contradictory and which was “violently attacked” by judges and 
commentators150 for its inconsistency151 and lack of foundational support.152 
The passage of Dodd-Frank in 2010 resolved most of this confusion.153  
The law added to the CEA the ability to prosecute fraud, not just 
manipulation.154  The CEA now prohibits the use of “any manipulative or 
 
 149. Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 147, at 362–63. 
 150. See Pirrong, supra note 147, at 945. 
 151. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1166, 1172–73 (8th Cir. 1971) 
(criticizing the Fifth Circuit’s approach in Volkart Brothers v. Freeman, a seminal 
case of commodities fraud, which it noted was reached “without any economic 
analysis whatsoever” and with no discussion of “its apparent discrepancy with the 
Great Western case”). 
 152. See Note, The Delivery Requirement: An Illusory Bar to Regulation of 
Manipulation in Commodity Exchanges, 73 YALE L.J. 171, 180–81 (1963) (criticizing 
the Fifth Circuit’s approach in Volkart Brothers v. Freeman, a seminal case of 
commodities fraud, which it argued was “not well founded”). 
 153. To a significantly lesser extent, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 also worked to strengthen federal prohibitions 
on commodities fraud.  Sarbanes-Oxley was passed in 2002 in response to the Enron 
scandal, and created 18 U.S.C. § 1348.  Section 1348 creates a new securities fraud 
crime that exists independently of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, and the SEC regulations that both Acts empowered it to promulgate.  
Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the 
Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 
681–84 (2002).  Securities fraud under Section 1348 largely mirrored the prohibition 
on securities fraud that had existed previously, though perhaps made it easier to 
prosecute. Id. at 681–82.  Many commentators viewed Section 1348 as largely 
repetitive and ineffectual, though Kathleen Brickey argued that it “make[s] significant 
strides toward piercing the veil of corporate silence.” Kathleen F. Brickey, From 
Enron to Worldcom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 357, 359 (2003).  In 2009, FERA amended Section 1348 and added “and 
commodities” before “fraud” and “any commodity for future delivery, or any option 
on a commodity for future delivery, or” before “any security.” Cindy A. Schipani & 
H. Nejat Seyhun, Defining “Material, Nonpublic”: What Should Constitute Illegal 
Insider Information?, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 327, 360 n. 203 (2016).  There 
is little academic discussion of FERA’s impact beyond this note, and no academic 
discussion of commodities fraud prosecution in the year between FERA’s passage and 
Dodd-Frank’s. See, e.g., id. at 360 (“In 2009, [Section 1348] was amended by [FERA] 
to extend the criminal penalties to commodities fraud.”). 
 154. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 147, at 392–93.  In many ways, the 
addition of fraud to the CEA settled a debate that had been brewing in the background 
since the CEA’s adoption nearly a century earlier. See Harry B. Borders, Note, Ernst 
& Ernst v. Hochfelder As Applied to Commodities Fraud: No Intent Required, 79 KY. 
L.J. 369, 375 (1991) (“Although the 1936 Act contained no antifraud provision, [an] 
amendment would have made it illegal to ‘knowingly’ defraud a consumer. The 
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deceptive device or contrivance, in contravention of such rules and regulations 
as the [CFTC] shall promulgate,” “in connection with any swap, or a contract 
of sale of any commodity interstate commerce.”155  This language mirrors 
almost verbatim the relevant provisions of the Securities Exchange Act.156  
The CFTC later promulgated Rule 180.1, which included a broad prohibition 
on manipulation and fraud in connection with a swap, commodity sale, or 
contract for future delivery.157  The Rule echoes SEC Rule 10b-5,158 and 
establishes that, in connection with the aforementioned transactions, it is 
illegal to: 
(1) Use or employ, or attempt to use or employ, any manipulative 
device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) Make, or attempt to make, any untrue or misleading statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made not untrue or misleading; 
(3) Engage, or attempt to engage, in any act, practice, or course of 
business, which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon 
any person; or, 
(4) Deliver or cause to be delivered, or attempt to deliver or cause to 
be delivered, for transmission through the mails or interstate 
commerce, by any means of communication whatsoever, a false or 
misleading or inaccurate report concerning crop or market information 
or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity 
in interstate commerce, knowing, or acting in reckless disregard of the 
fact that such report is false, misleading or inaccurate.159 
In adopting Rule 180.1, the CFTC further mirrored the SEC’s Rule by 
noting that it “does not interpret the final Rule as requiring a showing of 
 
amendment was rejected, apparently because Congress believed that prosecution 
under state laws was a sufficient deterrent for fraud.”). 
 155. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2018). 
 156. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018) (prohibiting anyone from using, “in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange 
or any security not so registered, or any securities-based swap agreement, any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange Commission] may prescribe”); Verstein, 
supra note 148, at 253–54. 
 157. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2019). 
 158. Gregory Scopino, The (Questionable) Legality of High-Speed “Pinging” and 
“Front Running” in the Futures Markets, 47 CONN. L. REV. 607, 663–66 (2015). 
 159. § 180.1. 
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reliance or harm to market participants in a government action brought” under 
7 U.S.C. § 9 or Rule 180.1.160  The CFTC also established that, in interpreting 
the scope of the Rule, “it will be guided, but not controlled by, the substantial 
body of judicial precedent applying the comparable language of SEC Rule 
10b-5.”161 
2.  Elements of Commodities Fraud 
The requirements of Section 9 and Rule 180.1 have been articulated 
slightly differently by the CFTC and the courts,162 but this Article proceeds 
on the conclusion that the elements of commodities fraud are: (1) a material 
misrepresentation, (2) scienter (or intent), and (3) a connection to a 
 
 160. See Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment of 
Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 41398, 41403 (July 14, 2011). 
 161. Id. at 41399.  The CFTC noted that there are differences between the 
securities and derivatives markets that justify flexibility in developing a body of 
interpretation. Id. 
 162. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Southern Trust Metals, Inc., 
894 F.3d 1313, 1325 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom S. Trust Metals, Inc. v. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 139 S. Ct. 1464 (2019) (“The CFTC must 
prove the same three elements to establish liability under each . . . provision[]: ‘(1) the 
making of a misrepresentation, misleading statement, or a deceptive omission; (2) 
scienter; and (3) materiality.’” (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. R.J. 
Fitzgerald & Co., 310 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2002))); Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Gelfman Blueprint, Inc., No. 17-CV-07181, 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
207379, at *13–14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2018) (“[Section 9 and Rule 180.1] make it 
unlawful for any person, in connection with contracts of sale of any commodity in 
interstate commerce, including virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, to intentionally or 
recklessly: (1) use or employ, or attempt to use or employ, any manipulative device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud; (2) make, or attempt to make, any untrue or misleading 
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements made not untrue or misleading; or (3) engage, or attempt to 
engage, in any act, practice, or course of business, which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person.”); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
McDonnell, 332 F. Supp. 3d 641, 717 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (“To prove a violation . . . the 
Commission must show that Defendants engaged in prohibited conduct (i.e., 
employed a fraudulent scheme; made a material misrepresentation, misleading 
statement or deceptive omission; or engaged in a business practice that operated as a 
fraud); with scienter; and in connection with a contract of sale of a commodity in 
interstate commerce.”); Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment 
of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 
Fed. Reg. at 41400 (“Final Rule 180.1 prohibits fraud and fraud-based manipulations, 
and attempts: (1) By any person (2) acting intentionally or recklessly (3) in connection 
with (4) any swap, or contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or 
contract for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity (as 
defined in the CEA).”). 
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commodity.163  Scienter (or intent) as applied here is presumed to be 
satisfied,164 and the remaining two elements – material misrepresentation and 
connection to a commodity – are each addressed in turn.165 
Material misrepresentation, the first element, is logically divided into 
two sub-elements: (a) a misrepresentation (b) that is material.166  Rule 180.1 
outlines four different types of misrepresentations for which it provides 
criminal (and civil) liability, which echo SEC Rule 10b-5’s prohibited acts.167  
Unlike securities fraud, commodities fraud – as articulated by the CFTC –
excludes insider trading.168  In any event, the conduct covered by Rule 180.1 
 
 163. This conclusion is grounded in the CFTC’s own articulation of the 
requirements, and by its acknowledgement that Rule 180.1 is based off of – and that 
the CFTC’s enforcement of the Rule will be guided by the judicial precedent applying 
– SEC Rule 10b-5. See supra note 158 at 41400, 41399.  For a securities fraud 
prosecution, the requirements under Rule 10b-5 are: “(1) a material misrepresentation 
(or omission); (2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind; [and] (3) a connection with 
the purchase or sale of a security.” Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, 61 
DUKE L.J. 511, 545–46 (2011). 
 164. Though intent is undoubtedly a critical element of commodities fraud, it is 
largely a question of fact. See SEC v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 311 F. App’x 250, 252 
(11th Cir. 2009).  This Article does not attempt to address it in the abstract.  Instead, 
this Article proceeds on the assumption that the conduct outlined in Part I occurred as 
characterized – in other words, that a group of people published fake polls intending 
to affect online political betting markets like PredictIt.  It goes without saying that if 
the CFTC opted to pursue an enforcement action for this conduct, it would have to 
prove intent. 
 165. In discussing the elements of commodities fraud, this Article frequently cites 
cases and articles that discuss what qualifies as securities fraud.  These conclusions 
should be taken with a grain of salt, given that the CFTC finds securities fraud 
jurisprudence persuasive, not binding.  Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted 
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price 
Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41399.  Therefore, this Article does not use brackets in 
this discussion to replace “securities” with “commodities.” 
 166. See James J. Park, Rule 10b-5 and the Rise of the Unjust Enrichment 
Principle, 60 DUKE L.J. 345, 360 (2011) (discussing the requirement “that there be a 
misrepresentation that is material”). 
 167. Supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 168. Jerry W. Markham, Commodity Exchanges and Regulation, in 
COMMODITIES: MARKETS, PERFORMANCE, AND STRATEGIES 37, 45–46 (H. Kent Baker 
et al., eds., 2018). “Nevertheless, trading on ‘misappropriated information’ (i.e., stolen 
information) is prohibited. Trading [on] or disclosing nonpublic information to others 
is prohibited for CFTC commissioners and their employees, personnel of [self-
regulatory organizations], as well as employees and members of Congress and judicial 
employees.” Id. at 46.  For an argument that commodities fraud should include insider 
trading, see Andrew Verstein, Insider Trading in Commodities Markets, 102 VA. L. 
REV. 447 (2016). 
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is broad: in the related securities fraud context, “Any form of publicized 
deception can create liability.”169  But unlike wire fraud,170 “there can be no 
securities fraud liability for a true statement.”171  This limitation of liability 
for true statements exists even if the statements were not “literally false, [but] 
taken as a whole . . . were fraudulently misleading and deceptive.”172 
Further, a misrepresentation also must be material.  Implicit in this 
requirement is the basic notion that “[n]ot all misrepresentations or omissions 
in connection with a security transaction . . . are fraudulent.”173  But defining 
“materiality” can be challenging.  The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that the 
determination of materiality “requires delicate assessments of the inferences 
a ‘reasonable shareholder’ would draw from a given set of facts and the 
significance of those inferences to him.”174  If the misrepresentation (or 
omission) “would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available,” the 
misrepresentation is generally considered to be material.175  A relatively 
simple case – though one that nonetheless made it to the Supreme Court – 
helps illustrate this concept.  In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, a group 
of plaintiffs brought a suit against Matrixx, a pharmaceutical company that 
manufactured the popular Zicam cold remedies.176  The plaintiffs alleged that 
Matrixx had become aware of Zicam’s side effects but did not disclose them.  
Instead, it made public statements to investors predicting that revenue would 
rise by 80%.177  The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that Matrixx’s 
knowledge of these side effects was “material” because it “had information 
indicating a significant risk to its leading revenue-generating product.”178  In 
other words, the Court concluded that “a reasonable investor would have 
viewed this information as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of 
information available.”179 
Second, a material misrepresentation must be “in connection with any 
swap, or contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or contract 
 
 169. Ron Joshua Havas et al., Securities Fraud, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1787, 1792 
(2017). 
 170. Infra Part II.B. 
 171. See In re Loewen Group Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 98-6740, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
15680, at *41 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2013). 
 172. Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 136–37 (9th Cir. 1967) (discussing 
wire fraud liability even for “literally true” statements); but see generally Donald C. 
Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 87 (1999) (comparing treatment of half-truths in the securities fraud 
context with treatment in the common law fraud context). 
 173. Havas et al., supra note 169, at 1796. 
 174. TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976). 
 175. See Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 556 (6th Cir. 2001), overruled by 
Ricker v. Zoo Entm’t, Inc., 534 F. App’x 495 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 176. 563 U.S. 27, 30–31 (2011). 
 177. Id. at 31–34. 
 178. Id. at 47. 
 179. Id. (quotation and citation omitted). 
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for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity.”180  In 
this context, “in connection with” is meant “broadly, not technically or 
restrictively.”181  When it promulgated Rule 180.1, the CFTC interpreted the 
phrase to “reach all manipulative or deceptive conduct in connection with the 
purchase, sale, solicitation, execution, pendency, or termination” of any 
commodity.182  This requirement is “not limitless,”183 however, and the CFTC 
essentially adopted the Supreme Court’s interpretation of SEC Rule 10b-5 to 
require that, at a minimum, a transaction occur.184 
Similarly, “any commodity in interstate commerce” is a broad phrase – 
like the definition of “security” in the context of securities law185 – and this 
broad phrasing dovetails with the broad definition of commodity under the 
current CEA.186  As one commenter put it, “[T]he CEA definition of 
‘commodity’ seems to include literally everything except, expressly, onions 
and movie box office receipts.”187  The CFTC’s regulatory authority extends 
well beyond the specific definition of “commodity” in the Act, given the far 
reach of categories of financial instruments like options and excluded 
commodities.188 
3.  Application of Commodities Fraud 
Considering the factual scenario discussed in Part I – in which a group 
of people create and distribute a fake poll to influence online political betting 
markets – commodities fraud liability likely comes to bear.  First, by 
publishing a “poll” that they did not actually conduct, the purveyors clearly 
communicated a misrepresentation.  This is a straightforward conclusion, but 
identifying the specific misrepresentation is conceptually necessary.  The 
misrepresentation here is best understood as: “I conducted a poll of the 
election, the results of which showed Candidate A with X% of the vote and 
Candidate B with Y%.”  The misrepresentation is necessarily comprised of 
both clauses of the statement.  Someone who misrepresents that they 
 
 180. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2019). 
 181. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment of Manipulative 
and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41405. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See id. at 41405–06; see also Havas et al., supra note 169, at 1800. 
 185. Havas et al., supra note 169, at 1800–02. 
 186. Supra notes 143–145 and accompanying text. 
 187. Timothy E. Lynch, Derivatives: A Twenty-First Century Understanding, 43 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 13 n.48 (2011). 
 188. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Trade Exch. Network Ltd., 117 
F. Supp. 3d 29, 37–38 (D.D.C. 2015). 
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conducted a poll without releasing the results undoubtedly makes a 
misrepresentation, but one that is unlikely to be material.  On the other hand, 
someone who misrepresents that they believe Candidate A will win X% of the 
vote may be making a statement that is neither misleading189 nor material.190  
Here, their entire statement is misleading – they did not conduct a poll 
showing Candidate A with X% of the vote and stating otherwise is false. 
Second, their misrepresentation was likely material.  To some extent, 
this can be a difficult element to prove in the abstract – materiality is usually 
seen as a mixed question of law and fact, though some courts view it as a pure 
question of fact.191  Nonetheless, on a practical level, several things are true: 
PredictIt bettors rely on a variety of public information, including polls, in 
making their betting decisions.192  Polls have affected betting markets for 
nearly a hundred years – well before the creation of online political betting 
markets like the IEM and PredictIt – and have actually made betting markets 
less accurate, which reflects the extent to which bettors take them into 
account.193  Therefore, it seems a likely conclusion in this instance that, at a 
 
 189. The resolution of this question, though unnecessary for this Article, depends 
on the application of courts’ frequently contradictory jurisprudence of when an 
opinion is misleading and gives rise to securities fraud liability. See Wendy Gerwick 
Couture, Opinions Actionable as Securities Fraud, 73 LA. L. REV. 381, 386–429 
(2013) (for an in-depth discussion of this jurisprudence). 
 190. There could be circumstances where someone with a well-earned reputation 
for accuracy in political prognostication – like, for example, Nate Silver – could 
communicate a material misrepresentation if he falsely represented his belief that 
Candidate A would receive X% of the vote. See Va. Bankshares v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 
1083, 1090–91 (1991) (discussing liability for corporate directors’ statements of belief 
if false because “[s]hareholders know that directors usually have knowledge and 
expertise far exceeding the normal investor’s resources . . . .”).  However, this can be 
difficult to prove. See generally Podany v. Robertson Stephens, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 
146 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (in which the court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims that “an equity 
analyst engaged in a scheme . . . to commit securities fraud by publishing false 
statements of opinion about certain issuers in reports disseminated by [his employer] 
broker-dealer” for lack of proof). 
 191. Compare United States v. Litvak, 808 F.3d 160, 169 (2d Cir. 2015), and ABC 
Arbitrage Plaintiffs Grp. v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 359 (5th Cir. 2002), and Weiner 
v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 1997), with Bacon v. Stiefel Labs., 
677 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2010). 
 192. Enten, supra note 11; Perticone, supra note 7; see PREDICTIT, Frequently 
Asked Questions, supra note 25. 
 193. Robert S. Erikson & Christopher Wlezian, Markets vs. Polls as Election 
Predictors: An Historical Assessment, 31 ELECTORAL STUDIES 532, 535 (2011) 
(“[T]he correlation and regression-based evidence indicates that the knowledgeable 
price-setters were able to gauge degrees of relative Democratic vs. Republican 
strength with amazing clarity – greater, so it appears, than price-setters in the thinner 
markets of the polling era. Polls may have had a distorting effect on markets. When 
the polls have been accurate, so too have been market prices. But when polls have 
gone wrong, so have market prices.”); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text 
(discussing impact of Delphi Analytica poll on PredictIt share prices). 
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minimum, polls affect the “‘total mix’ of information made available”194 – and 
it seems possible that polls actually drive the “total mix,” too.195 
Whether these “polls” affected the “total mix” is a closer question, 
however. Fake polls are still relatively rare, so it can be difficult to isolate 
them from “real” polls to determine their effect on political betting markets or 
on expectations more generally.  But to some extent, the effects of one fake 
poll – the Delphi Analytica poll of the Michigan Senate race – can serve as a 
case study.  As mentioned previously, the release of the poll resulted in the 
value of Senator Debbie Stabenow’s “share” on PredictIt dropping by nearly 
20%,196 the largest volume of trades (by far!) the following day.197  The poll 
was also widely distributed by the media,198 Kid Rock himself,199 and Texas 
Governor Greg Abbott.200  Though the media didn’t distribute the results of 
other fake polls, political prognosticators have noted that the American news 
media has a systemic problem with accurately reporting on public opinion 
polls,201 and fake news more generally,202 which bodes poorly for responsible 
media reporting of suspected fake polls in the future.203  With that context in 
mind, promulgating a fake poll could be material depending on the attendant 
circumstances – which include the extent to which the poll’s release was 
correlated with a noticeable increase in the volume of trading in a particular 
market, the distribution of the poll online, and so on. 
Finally, the material misrepresentation was likely made in connection 
with a commodity.  The exact nature of this financial instrument is somewhat 
of an open question,204 as is the CFTC’s ability to regulate political prediction 
 
 194. Supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 195. Supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 196. Supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 197. Supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 198. E.g., Kid Rock 4 Points Ahead in Race for Michigan Senate Seat, Poll Says, 
FOX NEWS (July 25, 2017), https://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/kid-rock-4-
points-ahead-in-race-for-michigan-senate-seat-poll-says [perma.cc/7L6F-B3FJ]. 
 199. Judy Kurtz, Kid Rock Tweets Poll Showing Him Leading Senate Race, HILL 
(July 24, 2017), https://thehill.com/blogs/in-the-know/in-the-know/343461-kid-rock-
tweets-poll-showing-him-leading-senate-race [perma.cc/5J3G-FKB2]. 
 200. Jeremy Wallace, Was Gov. Abbott Punk’d by Fake Poll?, HOUSTON CHRON. 
(Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.chron.com/news/politics/texas/article/Was-Gov-
Abbott-punk-d-by-fake-poll-11951030.php [perma.cc/XYH5-22Z5]. 
 201. E.g., Nate Silver, The Media Has a Probability Problem, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 
(Sept. 21, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-media-has-a-probability-
problem/ [perma.cc/M5K3-H7WP]. 
 202. See generally Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail: The 
Persistence of Political Misperceptions, 32 POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 303 (2010). 
 203. See generally Enten, supra note 11. 
 204. Supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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markets – or, at least, it was an open question prior to the passage of Dodd-
Frank.205  The CFTC has two bases of authority for claiming that it has 
jurisdiction over political prediction markets: the CEA and Dodd-Frank.206  In 
its definition of “commodity,” the CEA gave the CFTC regulatory authority 
over “all services, rights, and interests . . . in which contracts for future 
delivery are presently or in the future dealt in,”207 including event contracts.208  
The passage of Dodd-Frank in 2010 supplemented the CFTC’s authority by 
giving them sole authority209 to approve contracts “that are based upon the 
occurrence, extent of an occurrence, or contingency,” which by its very terms, 
explicitly includes event contracts.210  The CFTC has, in turn, fully embraced 
this authority – relying on both the CEA and Dodd-Frank – to grant no-action 
letters to some political prediction markets211 and to issue orders prohibiting 
markets from operating.212 
In an even stronger indicia of its jurisdiction over these markets, the 
CFTC has also pursued repeated enforcement actions against InTrade, an 
Irish-operated political prediction market.213  In response to the CFTC’s 2012 
enforcement action, InTrade resisted the CFTC’s exercise of its 
jurisdiction.214  However, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
 
 205. Infra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 206. Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Energy and Climate Change: A Climate 
Prediction Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1962, 1993–94 (2014). 
 207. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2018). 
 208. See Vandenbergh et al., supra note 206 at 1994. 
 209. Id. 
 210. 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(5) (2018). 
 211. E.g., Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, supra note 6; 
Letter from Andrea Corcoran to George R. Neumann, supra note 42; Letter from 
Vincent McGonagle to Neil Quigley, supra note 9.  The issuance of a no-action letter 
may not explicitly indicate that the CFTC believes it has jurisdiction over a particular 
subject matter or organization, but in another context, the CFTC noted that it “has 
many tools to reduce or eliminate regulatory burdens on entities or activities within its 
jurisdiction,” including “staff exemptive, no-action, and interpretative letters.” 
Trading Commission’s Consolidated Reply in Support of its Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
Motion to Dismiss in Part at 10, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n v. U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n, 67 F. Supp. 3d 373 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 13-1916). 
 212. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Issues 
Order Prohibiting North American Derivatives Exchange’s Political Event 
Derivatives Contracts (Apr. 2, 2012), 
https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6224-12 [perma.cc/NL9C-HV4B]; 
see also Kesan & Hayes, infra note 221, at 812–13 (discussing CFTC’s finding that 
the North American Derivatives Exchange’s political futures contracts were “contrary 
to the public interest”). 
 213. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Trade Exch. Network Ltd., 117 
F. Supp. 3d 29, 31–34 (D.D.C. 2015) (discussing 2005 and 2012 CFTC enforcement 
actions). 
 214. Id. at 35, 37 (discussing InTrade arguments that the contracts it offered “are 
not options” and are excluded from the CEA’s definition of “commodity”). 
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fully rejected these arguments and held that the futures contracts traded on 
InTrade’s prediction markets – which included contracts concerning weather-
related events and economic data – were “commodity options [regulated] 
under the Act.”215 
Admittedly, the CFTC’s actions occurred while an academic debate – 
albeit a mild one – was quietly simmering over whether the CFTC could 
properly exercise jurisdiction over political prediction markets.  Several 
leading scholars argued that the CFTC’s jurisdiction is either nonexistent or 
unclear;216 chief among them was Professor Tom Bell, who has written 
extensively on the subject of prediction markets.217  Bell argued that the 
average claim on a prediction market is classified as a “hybrid instrument 
predominantly a security,” which would exclude it from CFTC oversight by 
the CFTC’s own regulations.218  That classification contains a crucial 
exception, however, for an instrument “marketed as a futures contract,”219 
which applies in PredictIt’s case.220  It is worth noting, however, that the 
academic debate over the CFTC’s jurisdiction largely occurred before the 
2010 passage of Dodd-Frank and that the discussion following the Act’s 
passage, though limited, has leaned much more heavily in support of the 
CFTC’s jurisdiction.221 
 
 215. Id. at 38.  InTrade’s specific argument was that contracts “based on questions 
about weather events and economic statistics” were not “goods or articles” 
contemplated under the CEA. Id. at 37.  However, the court noted that the CEA’s 
definition of “commodity” includes a large scope of financial instruments and held 
that InTrade’s contracts were appropriately considered “commodity options under the 
Act.” Id. 
 216. Infra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 217. See generally, Tom W. Bell, Private Prediction Markets and the Law, 3 J. 
PREDICTION MARKETS 89 (2009); Tom W. Bell, Prediction Markets for Promoting the 
Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 37, 67–77 (2006); 
Tom W. Bell, Gambling for the Good, Trading for the Future: The Legality of Markets 
in Science Claims, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 159 (2002). 
 218. Bell, Prediction Markets for Promoting the Progress of Science and the 
Useful Arts, supra note 217 at 68–69. 
 219. 17 C.F.R. § 34.3(a)(3)(ii) (2019). 
 220. Terms and Conditions, PREDICTIT, supra note 24; see also Press Release, 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, supra note 6; Letter from Vincent McGonagle 
to Neil Quigley, supra note 9. 
 221. Compare Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets 
for Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1374 (2007) (noting that 
the CFTC’s jurisdiction is unclear), and Bell, Prediction Markets for Promoting the 
Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, supra note 217, at 67–77 (arguing the CFTC 
does not have jurisdiction), and Miriam A. Cherry & Robert L. Rogers, Prediction 
Markets and the First Amendment, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 863–64 (2008) (noting 
that the CFTC’s jurisdiction is “not entirely clear”), and Cleary, supra note 32 at 961 
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In any event, by PredictIt’s own terms and conditions, it is selling 
“futures contracts linked to political or financial events and 
circumstances.”222  It is therefore prevented from evading the CFTC’s 
jurisdiction under the classification identified by Bell,223 and futures contracts 
are irrefutably under the CFTC’s oversight, anyway.224  All of this is to say 
that the weight of the available evidence and legal analysis strongly suggests 
that any material misrepresentation in the arena of fake polls is “in connection 
with a commodity,” thereby triggering commodities fraud liability for the 
actions.  But even if this conclusion is incorrect, liability can still attach to the 
publication of a fake poll – namely, through wire fraud. 
B.  Wire Fraud 
In this context, regardless of the applicability of the federal laws 
criminalizing commodities fraud – outlined in Section A – wire fraud serves 
as an additional source of legal liability.225  In many ways, it is a more 
 
n.29 (noting that the CFTC’s jurisdiction is unclear), and Goldberg, supra note 32 at 
435–38 (noting that the CFTC’s jurisdiction is unclear), and Alexandra Lee Newman, 
Comment, Manipulation in Political Prediction Markets, 3 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 205, 208 (2010) (noting that the CFTC’s jurisdiction over 
prediction markets is a point of disagreement, especially under the CEA’s anti-
manipulation regime), with Tom W. Bell, Government Prediction Markets: Why, 
Who, and How, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 403, 420–22 (2011) (noting that “it remains 
unclear and to what extent the jurisdiction of the [CFTC] would reach prediction 
markets offering trading in claims pertaining to public policy issues”), and Jerry Brito 
et al., Bitcoin Financial Regulation: Securities, Derivatives, Prediction Markets, and 
Gambling, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 144, 196–99 (2014) (noting the CFTC’s 
asserted jurisdiction over prediction markets), and Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, 
Bugs in the Market: Creating a Legitimate, Transparent, and Vendor-Focused Market 
for Software Vulnerabilities, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 812–13 (2016) (noting that the 
“CFTC’s recent actions concerning NADEX and [PredictIt] support” the claim that 
the “definition of commodity is broad enough that it could cover contracts in a political 
prediction market”), and Vanderbergh et al., supra note 206 at 1994–96, 2014–15 
(arguing that the CFTC has jurisdiction over political prediction markets).  Notably, 
Bell’s pre-Dodd-Frank opinion, that the CFTC did not have jurisdiction, softened after 
the Act’s passage, and he now describes the CFTC’s jurisdiction as “unclear.” See 
Bell, Government Prediction Markets: Why, Who, and How, at 420–22; Bell, 
Prediction Markets for Promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, supra 
note 217, at 67–77. 
 222. Terms and Conditions, PREDICTIT, supra note 24. 
 223. Bell, Prediction Markets for Promoting the Progress of Science and the 
Useful Arts, supra note 217, at 68–69. 
 224. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1a(9), 7a-2(c) (2018). 
 225. The proposed defendants in this case could be charged with both 
commodities and wire fraud.  Even though “a number of the underlying facts used to 
prove . . . securities fraud [would] also [be] used to prove . . . wire fraud,” the “two 
crimes are distinct and require the government to prove different elements in order to 
secure a conviction.” United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 967 (4th Cir. 1995).  
Accordingly, a prosecution based on both theories of liability would not violate the 
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appealing avenue of liability – certainly for a criminal prosecution226 – and 
inarguably easier to prove.  This Section outlines the elements of the offense, 
briefly explains the historical development of the wire fraud statute, and then 
applies the elements to the conduct described in Part I. 
1.  Defining Wire Fraud 
The wire fraud statute – currently codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1343 – was 
adopted in 1952 and was modeled after the mail fraud statute, which was first 
adopted in 1872.227  The statute contains nearly identical language to its sister 
statute, save for the jurisdictional hook,228 and both statutes are interpreted in 
pari materia.229  In other words, “Where the two statutes share the same 
language, the law developed under the mail fraud statute applies to wire fraud 
and vice versa.”230 
The statute is logically understood broken into several subparts: 
Someone must devise a “scheme or artifice to defraud” or to “obtain[] money 
or property.”231  This scheme must be intended to be accomplished through 
the use of “false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.”232  To 
execute the scheme, the actor must transmit “any writings, signs, signals, 
pictures, or sounds” through “wire, radio, or television communication in 
interstate or foreign commerce.”233  In interpreting the wire fraud statute, 
courts have concluded that it contains three elements: (1) a scheme to defraud, 
 
Blockburger test of double jeopardy because “each contains an element that is not 
contained in the other.  Securities fraud requires a showing of fraud in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security – an element not required to prove wire fraud.  
Wire fraud requires a showing of use of interstate wires – an element not required to 
prove securities fraud.” United States v. Regensberg, 604 F. Supp. 2d 625, 634 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 226. One advantage of commodities fraud is that it allows a private right of action, 
while wire fraud likely does not.  This Article focuses on the viability of a criminal 
prosecution for the conduct outlined in Part I, but this discussion should not occur at 
the expense of the victims of this fraud. 
 227. C.J. Williams, What is the Gist of the Mail Fraud Statute?, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 
287, 291–94, 304–05 (2014). 
 228. Id. at 305. 
 229. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355 n.2 (2005). 
 230. William K.S. Wang, Application of the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes 
to Criminal Liability for Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 220, 224 (2015). 
 231. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2018). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
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(2) the use of interstate wires in furtherance of the scheme, and (3) with 
specific intent to “deceive or defraud.”234 
First, the wire fraud statute requires a “scheme to defraud.”235  This term, 
by both its very nature and by Congress’s lack of any definition or 
specification, is a broad and ambiguous term.236  Courts interpreting its scope 
have responded to its breadth and ambiguity with gusto and have usually 
interpreted it broadly.237  At its core, the prohibition of a “scheme to defraud” 
reflects the courts’ idealistic standards of appropriate conduct: it prohibits 
“dishonest methods or schemes” and the use of “trick, deceit, chicane, or 
overreaching” to deprive someone of something with value.238  But in many 
ways, this prohibition does not appear to capture any particular conduct.  
Instead, it captures “a plan, intention, or state of mind, insufficient in itself to 
give rise to any kind of criminal sanctions.”239  It is perhaps unsurprising, then, 
that “[f]ew restrictions have been placed on what will be subject to 
prosecution under this statute.”240 
An obvious requirement in any scheme to defraud is a misrepresentation.  
A qualifying misrepresentation is significantly broader in wire fraud than it is 
for commodities fraud.241  “Although [wire fraud] can be committed by means 
of outright lies, literal falsity is seldom, if ever, required.”242  For example, 
wire fraud can attach to statements that may be “literally true,” but that taken 
 
 234. Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1400 (9th 
Cir. 1986).  Many courts articulate these three requirements differently.  For example, 
the Fifth Circuit notes that there are only two elements: “(1) a scheme to defraud and 
(2) the use of interstate communications in furtherance of the scheme.” United States 
v. Gordon, 780 F.2d 1165, 1171 (5th Cir. 1986).  In Gordon, the Fifth Circuit noted 
that the government in the mail fraud context must also prove “a specific intent to 
commit fraud.” Id. at 1170 (quoting United States v. Freeman, 619 F.2d 1112, 1117 
(5th Cir. 1980)).  Regardless, these three requirements are universally accepted as 
coterminous with both mail and wire fraud. E.g., Wendy Gerwick Couture, White 
Collar Crime’s Gray Area: The Anomaly of Criminalizing Conduct Not Civilly 
Actionable, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009). 
 235. Gerwick Couture, supra note 234, at 4. 
 236. Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 
789 (1980). 
 237. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: 
Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 160 (1993). 
 238. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987) (quoting 
Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924)). 
 239. Rakoff, supra note 236, at 775 (internal citations omitted). 
 240. Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 729, 753–54 (1999) (“An 
incredible array of schemes have been prosecuted under the mail fraud statute.  One 
finds, for example, ‘divorce mill’ fraud, insurance fraud, securities fraud, and 
franchise fraud.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 241. Supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text (discussing misrepresentation in 
the commodities fraud context). 
 242. Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral 
Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 
157, 188 (2001). 
36
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/7
2020] FAKE POLLS 165 
 
 
as a whole, are “fraudulently misleading and deceptive.”243  The nature of the 
misrepresentation interacts with the materiality and intent of the statement, 
discussed infra, because courts generally recognize that a statement that is 
“material and made with intent to deceive” qualifies as a misrepresentation.244 
Though materiality is not explicitly mentioned in either the mail or wire 
fraud statutes, the Supreme Court added a materiality requirement to mail, 
wire, and bank fraud prosecutions in Neder v. United States.245  In defining 
“materiality,” the Court approvingly quoted the Second Restatement of Torts’ 
definition of materiality, which provides that a matter is material if: 
(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or 
nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in 
question; or 
(b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that 
its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in 
determining his choice of action, although a reasonable man would not 
so regard it.246 
Federal courts disagree on the application of this materiality requirement – a 
circuit split has developed between circuits that apply an “objective standard, 
which measures [schemes] as applied to the hypothetical reasonable victim” 
and those that apply a “subjective standard, which takes into account the 
particular perspective of actual victims of a deception.”247  
But all courts agree that the standard of materiality adopted by the Court 
in Neder is looser for mail and wire fraud than it is for commodities and 
securities fraud.248  A necessary implication of both the objective and 
subjective standards is that “material” is defined as including statements that 
“an objectively reasonable person would not regard as important.”249  The 
minimization of a “reasonable” recipient of deceptive information – even 
under the objective standard – perhaps reflects that “materiality” operates at a 
less practical level in wire fraud than it does in commodities or securities 
fraud.  Liability in wire fraud is not predicated on the success of the fraud or 
 
 243. E.g., Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 136–37 (9th Cir. 1967). 
 244. Green, supra note 242, at 188. 
 245. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 20–25 (1999). 
 246. Id. at 22 n.5 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (Am. Law 
Inst. 1976)). 
 247. Mark Zingale, Note, Fashioning a Victim Standard in Mail and Wire Fraud: 
Ordinarily Prudent Person or Monumentally Credulous Gull?, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
795, 796 (1999). 
 248. Gerwick Couture, supra note 234, at 6. 
 249. Id. at 8 (emphasis added); supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
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even its completion.250  It is instead predicated on the attempt itself.251  
Therefore, it makes intuitive sense that the current trend in evaluating 
materiality focuses on “using the credibility of the scheme merely as an 
indicator of whether the defendant possessed the requisite intent to 
defraud.”252  After all, if a scheme was not seen through to completion, it could 
not be classified as “material” under the standard used in commodities fraud 
– it affected neither its intended victims nor their behavior.  The divergent 
attention paid to effects under both theories of liability reflects the core 
difference between the two theories.  Though commodities fraud defines 
“materiality” loosely253 – but certainly not as loosely as wire fraud – it focuses 
the bulk of its energy on the likelihood that a reasonable investor would 
consider the statement, or its omission, “important in deciding how to 
vote.”254 
The remaining two elements – transmission by “wire, radio, or television 
communication” and intent – are simpler than materiality and require less 
explanation.  First, federal courts have largely interpreted the transmission 
requirement loosely to encompass activity only tangentially related to the 
actual fraud.255  The Supreme Court held in Schmuck v. United States that an 
interstate communication need only be “incident to an essential part of the 
scheme” or a mere “step in the plot” to be “for the purpose of executing” the 
scheme.256  This flexible approach grew out of the mail fraud statute’s broad 
reach and original intent – which was to “punish those who misused a 
government agency, namely the United States Post Office, in the purpose of 
executing a fraudulent scheme.”257  In keeping with that purpose, the original 
statute was interpreted from the very beginning to designate each separate 
mailing as a separate offense.258  The result of this broad approach – which 
triggers federal jurisdiction over transmissions that are incidental or 
sometimes even made by actors other than the fraudsters themselves – has 
been the growing use of the mail and wire fraud statutes to bring what might 
ordinarily be state-level fraud crimes to federal court.259 
 
 250. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1999) (noting that the statute 
“prohibit[s] the ‘scheme to defraud,’ rather than the completed fraud”). 
 251. Id. 
 252. Gerwick Couture, supra note 234, at 8–9. 
 253. See generally Dale A. Oesterle, The Overused and Under-defined Notion of 
“Material” in Securities Law, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 167 (2011). 
 254. Id. at 175 (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)); see 
also supra notes 173–173 and accompanying text. 
 255. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 712 (1989). 
 256. Id. at 710–11 (1989) (quoting Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 
1916)).  Though Schmuck was decided in the mail fraud context, its holding has been 
similarly applied to wire fraud. See, e.g., United States v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 
1272–73 (2003) (applying Schmuck to wire fraud prosecution). 
 257. Williams, supra note 227, at 287. 
 258. Id. 
 259. See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 722–23 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
38
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/7
2020] FAKE POLLS 167 
 
 
In keeping with this broad interpretation, the statute has evolved with the 
times as the definition of “wire” expanded from physical telephone wires to 
wireless Internet transmissions.  The statute is now widely understood to 
include crimes that involve the use of computers and the Internet generally.260  
This reach is necessarily broad – it’s likely that the jurisdictional element of 
the wire fraud statute even applies to Internet communications that are sent 
and received in the same state.261  “Because of fluctuations in the volume of 
Internet traffic and determinations by the systems as to what line constitutes 
the ‘Shortest Path First,’ a website connection request can travel entirely 
intrastate or partially interstate.”262  Accordingly, many courts have 
essentially held that the “very interstate nature of the Internet” means that any 
Internet activity results in data traveling in interstate commerce.263  Some 
courts have distanced themselves from this generous application and have 
articulated that the government needs to prove more in a wire fraud 
prosecution based on Internet activity, such as evidence that a defendant 
uploaded content to a server based in one state and that the server transmitted 
the content across state lines to a “local host server.”264 
 
 260. E.g., Richard W. Downing, Shoring Up the Weakest Link: What Lawmakers 
Around the World Need to Consider in Developing Comprehensive Laws to Combat 
Cybercrime, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 705, 725 n.39 (2005) (collecting cases). 
 261. Morgan Cloud & George Shepherd, Law Deans in Jail, 77 MO. L. REV. 931, 
946 (2012) (“[T]he geography of the internet makes it likely that messages travel 
across state lines, and perhaps across even national borders, even if the origin and 
destination sites are in the same state. Similarly, if packages are sent by private courier, 
the hub systems used by the leading companies makes it likely that packages traverse 
an interstate itinerary. Because knowledge of the bases for federal jurisdiction is not 
necessary under these statutes, the sender need not intend or even know that the email 
or package has crossed state lines.”) (emphasis added). 
 262. United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 244 (2006). 
 263. E.g., id. 
 264. United States v. Kieffer, 681 F.3d 1143, 1154–55 (10th Cir. 2012).  
“Accordingly, we have no quarrel with the narrow proposition [that] one individual’s 
use of the internet, ‘standing alone,’ does not establish an interstate transmission.” Id. 
at 1155 (quoting United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1200–01 (10th Cir. 2007)).  
See also Valeria G. Luster, Note, Let’s Reinvent the Wheel: The Interstate as a Means 
of Interstate Commerce in United States v. Kieffer, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 589, 597–99, 
601–07 (2015) (discussing Kieffer’s approach to the Internet in the wire fraud context).  
The most voluminous discussion – and disagreement – by the courts over the 
jurisdictional requirement for crimes, like wire fraud, that require interstate 
transmission has been in the realm of child pornography.  The federal laws prohibiting 
both wire fraud and child pornography use the same “‘in interstate commerce’ 
language” and are generally interpreted in tandem with each other. See Michael D. 
Yanovsky Sukenik, Distinct Words, Discrete Meanings: The Internet and Illicit 
Interstate Commerce, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1 22–23 (2011).  A circuit split 
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Finally, the government needs to prove that the defendant had an intent 
to defraud.265  This standard is perhaps the loosest of the three, and simply 
requires proof that the defendant possessed “an intent to deceive through 
misrepresentation”266 – though some courts have even found the intent 
requirement to be satisfied where the defendant merely had an intent to 
deceive.267  The government frequently uses circumstantial evidence to prove 
intent, like an attempt by the defendant to conceal their conduct, the 
defendant’s misrepresentations, the defendant’s knowledge that their 
statements were false, or even evidence of prior or subsequent bad acts.268 
2.  Applying Wire Fraud 
In many ways, despite the previous discussion of the nature of the 
interests on PredictIt – which suggests, at the very minimum, that they have 
commodity-like features – wire fraud fits more easily with the conduct, 
stripped to its basics, described in Part I.  Put simply, lies were communicated 
over the Internet in an attempt to yield a financial return for the liars.  This is 
textbook wire fraud.  The additional context – namely, that the lies were told 
to affect the value of some sort of financial instrument on a (pseudo-) stock 
exchange, as opposed to inducing the purchase or sale of a good or service – 
perhaps makes wire fraud a complementary charge in conjunction with 
commodities fraud.  Of course, the conduct that triggers liability for 
commodities fraud also frequently triggers liability for wire fraud,269 even if 
the reverse isn’t always true.  On a practical level, the more frequent 
prosecution of wire fraud, rather than commodities (or securities) fraud, 
occurs as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion because wire fraud 
prosecutions are both easier to prove and criminalize conduct usually left 
untouched by commodities fraud law alone.270 
Based on the facts outlined in Part I (and the probable inferences 
naturally drawn from them), the elements of wire fraud are almost assuredly 
 
has developed over whether the “in interstate commerce” requirement is satisfied by 
proof of Internet use alone. Jonathan R. Gray, United States v. Schaefer and United 
States v. Sturm: Why the Federal Government Should Regulate All Internet Use as 
Interstate Commerce, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 691, 697 n.57 (2013) (comparing cases). 
 265. Skye Lynn Perryman, Mail and Wire Fraud, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 715, 721–
24 (2006). 
 266. Julie R. O’Sullivan, Honest-Services Fraud: A (Vague) Threat to Millions of 
Blissfully Unaware (and Non-Culpable) American Workers, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN 
BANC 23, 35 (2010). 
 267. Wang, supra note 230, at 229–31. 
 268. Perryman, supra note 265, at 722–24. 
 269. See Gerwick Couture, supra note 234, at 3–4; see generally Wang, supra note  
230 (discussing wire fraud liability for insider trading). 
 270. Gerwick Couture, supra note 234, at 9–12 (discussing federal prosecutors’ 
use of the so-called “wire/mail fraud run-around” due to the lower materiality standard 
and the ability to charge defendants for “allegedly false forward-looking statements 
accompanied by meaningful cautionary language”). 
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met.  Like the discussion of commodities fraud in Section A, for the purposes 
of this discussion, this Article presumes without substantial discussion that 
the element of intent is satisfied.271  Based on the ends-driven application of 
the intent requirement by federal courts,272 the element of intent is satisfied 
even if the use of the internet was tangential to the overall scheme.273  In any 
event, the subpoenas preceding and discovery during a criminal trial or 
enforcement action by either the CFTC or the Department of Justice would 
definitively address this element.  This Subsection therefore proceeds by 
discussing the remaining two elements – the existence of a “scheme to 
defraud” and the use of wires to further the scheme. 
First, the conduct described in Part I is clearly a “scheme to defraud” 
under the wire fraud statute.  Like intent, however, the existence of a “scheme 
to defraud” is largely a question of fact.274  However, given that it has a higher 
standard of proof than intent275 and that the existence of such a scheme is 
undeniably central to any wire fraud prosecution, a greater discussion of this 
element is appropriate here. 
The practice of publishing fake polls with the goal of artificially driving 
up the price of futures contracts on PredictIt is best analogized to a pump-and-
dump scheme.  Fake polls serve as a reasonable analog for “intentionally 
misleading press releases”276 or “promotional materials contain[ing] false and 
misleading information”277 that are similarly published and distributed to 
artificially drive up (or down, in the case of a “distort-and-short” scheme) 
prices.  Pump-and-dump schemes – though perhaps somewhat uncommon in 
 
 271. Supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra notes 265–64 and accompanying text. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See, e.g., United States v. Doke, 171 F.3d 240, 243 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting 
that “intent to deceive” and the existence of a “scheme to defraud” are “questions of 
fact”); supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 275. See generally Perryman, supra note 265, at 722–24. 
 276. E.g., Robert J. Anello & Brian A. Jacobs, Securities Fraud, in WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME: BUSINESS AND REGULATORY OFFENSES § 12.02[2] (Otto G. Obermaier & 
Robert G. Morvillo eds., 2019). 
 277. E.g., United States v. Clark, 717 F.3d 790, 807 (10th Cir. 2013). 
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the context of futures contracts278 – are generally considered to be “schemes 
to defraud” in wire fraud prosecutions.279 
On a practical level, the scheme to defraud described in Part I included 
material misrepresentations.  The misrepresentation, as outlined supra in 
Section A, is essentially: “I conducted a poll of the election, the results of 
which showed Candidate A with X% of the vote and Candidate B with Y%.”  
If the purveyors of these fake polls did not actually conduct polls – or even if 
they conducted “polls” that seriously lacked in statistical accuracy and rigor 
such that its purveyors knew it was worthless information280 – they were 
communicating a misrepresentation. 
And that misrepresentation was material.  By either definition of 
“materiality” adopted by the Neder court281 – and by either the objective or 
 
 278. The paucity of both academic discussion and caselaw addressing “pump-and-
dump” or “distort-and-short” schemes in the context of futures markets suggests that 
these schemes are rare, though market manipulation obviously occurs. See generally 
Levy v. BASF Metals Ltd., 917 F.3d 106, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2019) (a rare “pump-and-
dump” case involving a scheme that manipulated the value of platinum futures in 
violation of the CEA”); Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures 
Prices – The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281 (1991) (discussing the 
difficulty of prosecuting manipulation of markets for futures contracts prior to 
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank).  Some of this rarity could come from the fact that 
“[c]ommodities that are readily available and can easily be transported cannot be 
cornered.” Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit 
“Manipulation” in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 547 n.193 (1991).  
Much of the “pump-and-dump” schemes prosecuted by the CFTC involve the 
manipulation of currency markets, not futures contracts. See Press Release, U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Warns Customers to Avoid Pump-and-
Dump Schemes (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/
pr7697-18 [perma.cc/HXF6-JMC6]. 
 279. See, e.g., United States v. Skelly, 442 F.3d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming 
conviction for wire fraud for “pump and dump” scheme in which the defendants “used 
manipulative techniques to artificially inflate (‘pump’) the price of certain thinly-
traded securities in which they held a substantial interest, and then used fraudulent and 
high-pressure tactics to unload (‘dump’) the securities on unsuspecting customers”). 
 280. This hypothetical – in which the publishers of these fake polls “conducted” a 
poll using shoddy methods and claimed that it was a poll conducted using statistical 
rigor – helpfully illustrates how wire fraud prosecutions differ from securities fraud 
prosecutions. See Enten, supra note 11.  This sort of hypothetical would likely be 
insufficiently misrepresentative to trigger securities fraud liability, because “literally 
true” statements cannot trigger securities fraud liability. Supra notes 166–64 and 
accompanying text.  However, because “literally true” statements can be the basis of 
wire fraud if they are still misrepresentative when viewed in context, a statement that 
an ostensibly reputable pollster conducted a poll – which implies a degree of statistical 
rigor that is absent from the actual “poll” conducted – may be “literally true” but 
nonetheless materially misrepresentative.  Even sidestepping the “literal falsehood” 
question, liability could still attach to shoddily conducted polls if prosecutors could 
prove that the representation of its accuracy was “made with reckless indifference to 
its truth or falsity.” United States v. Cusino, 694 F.2d 185, 187 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 281. Supra note 246 and accompanying text. 
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subjective standard put forth by the federal circuit courts282 – this sort of 
statement was material.  As explained in the context of commodities fraud, 
PredictIt users rely on polls to make buying and selling information,283 to 
some extent regardless of any one poll’s reliability.  Even more tellingly, the 
representation made by the publishers of these fake polls – namely, the results 
of the “polls” – was specifically crafted to be viewed as relevant to the narrow 
universe of PredictIt users.284 
But not only was the representation intended to be relevant, it was 
intended to be important, and PredictIt users understandably relied on the 
information, despite its flaws, in making decisions on the website.285  
Assuming that the strictest possible standard applies, the representation of the 
purveyors of fake polls was important to reasonable people.  The appropriate 
way to consider importance in this context is to consider how a PredictIt user 
would view the results of a single poll with dubious reliability – just like how 
we would consider how an investor would view a representation (or omission) 
in the context of a decision of her own.286  
In the fast-paced environments of Twitter287 and PredictIt, a poll of an 
upcoming election released by a new-on-the-scene pollster would likely be 
viewed with importance by a reasonable PredictIt user.  There are practical 
reasons why this is so.  Hundreds of pollsters regularly conduct and publish 
polls,288 preventing virtually everyone who does not have an eidetic 
recollection of political news from recognizing a new pollster instantly.  
Therefore, a PredictIt user seeking to purchase a futures contract on the 
outcome of the Republican primary in Alabama’s 2017 special U.S. Senate 
election who comes across a poll predicting a result of that exact election, 
allegedly conducted by CSP Polling,289 might reasonably consider that poll in 
their purchasing decision – even if they do not know that CSP lacks a track 
 
 282. Supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
 283. Enten, supra note 11; Perticone, supra note 7; Frequently Asked Questions, 
PREDICTIT, supra note 25; see also supra notes 192–91 and accompanying text for the 
discussion of the reliance that PredictIt users have on polls. 
 284. See generally Enten, supra note 11 (discussing the apparent goals of fake poll 
publishers). 
 285. Id. 
 286. See Wendy Gerwick Couture, Materiality and a Theory of Legal Circularity, 
17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 453, 459–60 (2015) (discussing how to measure importance in the 
securities fraud context); George S. Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose: Firm Size and 
Materiality Blindspot in Securities Regulation, 64 UCLA L. REV. 602, 622–23 (2017) 
(same). 
 287. See Deto, supra note 86 (discussing how quickly the fraudulent Blumenthal 
Research Daily poll spread). 
 288. See FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, supra note 108 (ranking pollsters by accuracy). 
 289. See DELPHI ANALYTICA, supra note 84. 
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record or any indicia of reliability.  And given the speed with which PredictIt 
users buy and sell contracts, a user seeing this information might reasonably 
conclude that if she is to use this information to her benefit, she needs to act 
quickly.290  But on the other hand, in the example of Blumenthal Research 
Daily, subsequent polls released after the pollster admitted its fraudulent 
nature may be less likely to be taken seriously by users. 
In other words, at the risk of stating the obvious, the importance of a fake 
poll to a PredictIt user is dependent on the context in which it is publicized: A 
fake poll – especially one that garners significant attention on social media, 
spreads rapidly, contains an estimated result that flies in the face of 
conventional wisdom, and comes from a new pollster291 – may be reasonably 
viewed as “important,” thereby triggering the Nader court’s definition of 
“materiality.” 
Second, the conduct described clearly involves the use of wires to 
achieve the intended scheme to defraud.  Though the caselaw has been 
relatively slow to explicitly encompass the use of Twitter, Facebook, and 
other social media platforms to commit wire fraud, the unanimity of the 
caselaw holds that the fraudulent use of the Internet to execute a scheme to 
defraud satisfies the statute’s jurisdictional element.292  Most of the developed 
caselaw regarding the Internet – in a context other than emails – has focused 
on fraudulent postings on a defendant’s own website, advertisements for 
sale,293 or postings on a sales-driven, pseudo-social media platform like 
eBay,294 but the existence of only these factual contexts does not limit wire 
fraud’s applicability.295 
In sum, the elements of wire fraud are clearly met when PredictIt users 
create and publish a fake poll with the intent of altering the prices of futures 
contracts on PredictIt’s markets.296  The lies told by these fraudsters – the 
alleged “results” of a poll they did not conduct – are best understood as 
 
 290. See Enten, supra note 11 (discussing the volume of trades in the Michigan 
Senate election following the July 2017 release of the Delphi Analytica poll); cf. 
Verstein, supra note 168, at 469 (noting that the “relative speed of commodities 
markets allow[s] information to be used very profitably”). 
 291. These characteristics describe the polls released by BRD and Delphi 
Analytica discussed supra at notes 75–85 and their accompanying text. 
 292. See Downing, supra note 260, at 725 n.39. 
 293. See United States v. Pirello, 255 F.3d 728, 730–31 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding 
wire fraud liability for fraudulent advertisements posted on online classifieds website). 
 294. United States v. Gajdik, 292 F.3d 555, 556 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding wire fraud 
liability for fraudulent posts on eBay). 
 295. See Downing, supra note 260, at 725 n.39. 
 296. This channel of criminal liability is less navigable if the motivation of the 
purveyors is different.  If, for example, malevolent actors publish a fake poll to benefit 
a campaign, it would be challenging to lay the foundation for a wire fraud prosecution.  
Even if the motivation was financial – for example, attracting campaign contributions 
– the causal link between the fraud and the financial loss is likely too weak.  Instead, 
fraud of that nature could be prosecuted under a different theory: the violation of 52 
U.S.C. § 30104(b) by failing to report an in-kind campaign contribution. 
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material misrepresentations, given the extent to which they affect the market 
decisions of PredictIt users. 
C.  Comparing the Avenues 
As the above discussion illustrates, neither theory of liability is perfect; 
the advantages of each are somewhat coterminous with the disadvantages of 
the other.  Wire fraud is perhaps a better fit, both in terms of standards of proof 
and the likelihood of its usage in a federal prosecution, but commodities fraud 
makes more sense given its subject-matter link to the conduct. 
 On that note, commodities fraud relates more naturally to the conduct 
meant to trigger criminal liability here.  While the exact classification of the 
interest available for purchase on PredictIt is unclear, it has the distinct feel of 
a financial instrument.  And in terms of practicality, commodities fraud, 
unlike wire fraud, has a private right of action,297  so even if federal 
prosecutors decline to pursue charges, the harmed PredictIt investors might 
have a civil claim. 
But the uncertainty in classifying the interests sold by PredictIt looms 
large over commodities fraud.  The CFTC or federal prosecutors may be loath 
to pursue commodities fraud charges if doing so requires them to litigate 
whether a commodity was even at issue.298  Further, the high threshold for 
materiality,299 at least compared to wire fraud,300 could make a commodities 
fraud prosecution dicier. 
While wire fraud may lack the tighter subject-area link of commodities 
fraud, it functions as a more utilitarian approach to the issue at hand.  
Especially compared to commodities fraud, wire fraud has easier materiality 
and jurisdictional requirements; prosecutors find mail and wire fraud “easier 
 
 297. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Revolution in Manipulation Law: The New 
CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical Analyses, 15 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 357, 362 (2013); Wang, supra note 230, at 227 n.17.  However, this private 
right of action does not extend to civil RICO actions. See Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 
U.S. 479, 505–06 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven though commodities fraud 
is not a predicate offense listed in § 1961, the carefully crafted private damages causes 
of action under the Commodities Exchange Act may be circumvented in a 
commodities fraud case through civil RICO actions alleging mail or wire fraud.”). 
 298. Cf. Mary M. Calkins, Note, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don’t They? An 
Economic Analysis of Anti-Hacking Regulatory Models, 89 GEO. L.J. 171, 193 (2000) 
(arguing that prosecutors are likelier to pursue fraud charges – rather than other 
charges, which in this case would have been hacking charges – when there is an 
“uncertain[]” statute at issue and the prosecutors fear the “difficulty of presenting a 
high-technology case to a lay judge and/or jury”). 
 299. Supra notes 191–99 and accompanying text. 
 300. Gerwick Couture, supra note 234, at 6. 
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to prove” than the underlying commodities or securities fraud statutes.301  And 
to the extent that the elements of either fraud charge is too difficult to prove, 
prosecutors could always fall back on conspiracy charges.  Further, unlike 
commodities fraud, wire fraud is a predicate act for both civil and criminal 
RICO claims,302 and as Justice Marshall noted in Imrex, commodities fraud 
claims can simply be converted to wire fraud claims to lay the groundwork 
for a civil RICO claim,303 demonstrating its versatility.   
III.  THE CASE FOR CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
In a vacuum, it may make little sense to criminally charge the people 
who create and publish fake polls to affect online political betting markets on 
PredictIt.  After all, given the CFTC-mandated restrictions on the markets,304 
the fraudsters likely made a collective profit of no greater than a few thousand 
dollars, and the individual loss amounts, absent some unusually large 
investments, may be even less substantial.  And given the unfortunately 
predictable commission of other, ostensibly more serious crimes, a federal 
prosecution for a loss amount of just a few thousand dollars may seem like a 
waste of time and money. 
In a vacuum, this may be true.  But the harms of distributing fake polls 
(to affect online markets or for other malicious purposes) are not coextensive 
with the financial loss that they cause some people to suffer.  This Part begins 
by arguing in Section A that fake polls can undermine the purpose of political 
markets like PredictIt and, more seriously, erode trust in polling companies 
and manipulate the democratic process.  Section B then discusses how these 
serious harms could be exploited by unethical candidates for political office 
or foreign governments seeking to sow discord in the United States.  Finally, 
Section C concludes this Part and argues that the concerns raised in the 
preceding Sections are weighty enough to justify the criminal prosecution of 
the conduct at hand. 
A.  The Known (and Possible!) Harms of Fake Polls 
This Section begins by noting the known harms that come from fake 
polls and later broadens the discussion by making reasonable guesses about 
possible harms that could flow from the distribution of fake polls in the future.  
Subsection 1 discusses the most obvious and least harmful consequence of 
fake polls: the purpose of political markets is defeated, and their academic 
 
 301. Wang, supra note 230, at 257 n.133; see also Peter R. Ezersky, Note, Intra-
Corporate Mail and Wire Fraud: Criminal Liability for Fiduciary Breach, 94 YALE 
L.J. 1427, 1440–42 (1985). 
 302. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2018) (defining “racketeering activity” as including 
“any act which is indictable under . . . section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), [and] 
section 1343 (relating to wire fraud)”). 
 303. Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 505–06 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 304. See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text. 
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potential quashed.  Subsection 2 ups the ante by arguing that the proliferation 
of fake polls threatens to smash the fragile trust that the public has in 
legitimate polling companies and the media.  Finally, Subsection 3 concludes 
this Section with the assertion that the very real effects of legitimate polls – 
like on turnout, fundraising, and even election results themselves – could 
become very real harms of fake polls. 
1.  Undermining the Purpose of Political Prediction Markets 
Markets like PredictIt – and the Iowa Electronic Markets before it – were 
formed with a distinctly academic purpose.305  Researchers at the universities 
that created and ran the markets wanted to know if the wisdom of crowds 
could yield more accurate predictions than public opinion polls could on their 
own.306  The answer – surprisingly or not – has been yes.  When spectators to 
an event risk their own money in guessing what an outcome is, they quite 
consistently prove to be more accurate.307  In many ways, this is to be 
expected.  While political scientists have long known that asking survey 
respondents, “Who do you think will win the X election?” is more accurate 
than asking them who they will vote for, those results have been tempered 
somewhat by the fact that survey respondents engage in wishful thinking.308  
Effectively asking pseudo-survey respondents to bet on the outcome of an 
election, therefore, seeks to remove wishful thinking from the equation 
altogether.309 
 
 305. Letter from Andrea Corcoran to George R. Neumann, supra note 42 (“The 
IEM is an electronic trading market trading contracts in specified ‘products’ which is 
organized as an experimental and academic program at the University of Iowa.”); 
Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, supra note 6 (“Like the 
[Iowa Electronic Markets], Victoria University of Wellington’s proposed market for 
event contracts [PredictIt] . . . is operated for academic research purposes only[.]”). 
 306. Frequently Asked Questions, PREDICTIT, supra note 25.  But PredictIt’s 
utility to researchers has expanded beyond this question.  For example, two political 
scientists used PredictIt data to evaluate the impact of Donald Trump’s victories in 
individual Republican primary contests to ascertain the effect on high-quality 
congressional candidates deciding to run. See generally Gavin Riley & Jacob Smith, 
The Trump Effect: Filing Deadlines and the Decision to Run in the 2016 
Congressional Elections, 16 FORUM 193 (2018). 
 307. Erikson & Wlezian, supra note 193, at 535. 
 308. David Rothschild & Justin Wolfers, Forecasting Elections: Voter Intentions 
Versus Expectations, 1–4, 34–38 (Jan. 23, 2013) (unpublished paper) (on file with the 
University of Pennsylvania Wharton School), http://users.nber.org/~jwolfers/
Papers/VoterExpectations.pdf [perma.cc/U3NJ-DQGD]. 
 309. Frequently Asked Questions, PREDICTIT, supra note 25.  This is consistent 
with PredictIt’s goal, as communicated on its website. Id. (“Prediction markets work 
best when players have some stake, however small, in the outcome.  With play money, 
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All of this careful planning is undone when fraud invades the market.  
Though PredictIt discloses to its users that there are “no controls on market 
manipulation,”310 it nonetheless issues a set of comprehensive terms and 
conditions governing user behavior, presumably to guard against the tainting 
of its data collection.311  The argument advanced in this Subsection – that harm 
to the literal market itself, as opposed to the ethereal market consisting of 
companies, their shareholders, and traders312 – is certainly not a traditional 
one.  Admittedly, few tears are shed for the New York Stock Exchange when 
traders engage in fraud on the market, but smaller, less-established markets 
have a vested interest in protecting their integrity.  The SEC’s ability to ban 
offenders from the markets or revoke an offender’s registration as a broker-
dealer313 can be seen in that light as a way of protecting the participants on the 
market and the market itself. 
Accordingly, the harm done to PredictIt’s viability and integrity as a 
political prediction market is a reason for criminal liability to attach to the act 
of distributing intentionally disruptive fake polls.  PredictIt’s users might 
reasonably conclude that the prices on the market don’t accurately reflect the 
value of the contract because they’re set by manipulated market trends and the 
fraudulent actions of users.314  Accordingly, they might choose to not 
participate in any of the markets that PredictIt offers, which given the 
relatively low ceiling on the number of users in any set market,315 could have 
a disproportionate effect on the market’s academic value.  And while this sort 
of academic or research-based harm is usually legally insufficient to trigger 
liability,316 it should trigger liability in the unique context presented here. 
 
many players take risks they wouldn’t otherwise take or don’t attend to their holdings 
as carefully.  Such markets may therefore have less research value than real money 
ones.”). 
 310. Terms and Conditions, PREDICTIT, supra note 24. 
 311. See generally id. 
 312. Usually, when courts and commentators refer to the market harms that flow 
from securities fraud, they are not referring to the literal market, but rather to the 
concept of “maintaining free securities markets.” Urska Velikonja, The Cost of 
Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887, 1901 n.55 (2013) (quotation 
omitted). 
 313. Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s 
Enforcement Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 935 (2016). 
 314. See Frequently Asked Questions, PREDICTIT, supra note 25. 
 315. Letter from Vincent McGonagle to Neil Quigley, supra note 9. 
 316. Cf. Abigail Brown, Medical Research: Understanding Pharmaceutical 
Research Manipulation in the Context of Accounting Manipulation, 41 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 611, 615–16 (2013) (“[T]here are generally no legal remedies for misleading 
or incorrect academic research – this would threaten the foundation of academic 
freedom.”). 
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2.  Destroying Trust in Polling Companies and the News Media 
It goes without saying that the American news media is facing a crisis of 
confidence.  For nearly a century, conservative politicians complained about 
the so-called “liberal media.”317  In recent years, this refrain has changed 
slightly.  Though politicians in the early 21st century referred to the “liberal 
media” or the “lamestream” media,318 they now refer to media reports they 
don’t like as “fake news”319 and associate the media with the so-called “Deep 
State.”320  This rhetorical shift capitalizes on and weaponizes an attempt to 
use an accurate term to describe a growing problem: fake news.  In the mid-
2010s, as participation on social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter 
became more universal, fabricated news began flooding users’ newsfeeds.321 
This reality (or unreality?) sunk in and gave many Americans a reason 
to do what they already did: disbelieve the news media.  Donald Trump began 
weaponizing the term, calling news organizations that he didn’t like “fake 
news” and “enemies of the American people.”322  This purposeful rhetoric has 
achieved its goal.  A Quinnipiac University poll from August 2018 found that 
26% of respondents believed that the news media was “the enemy of the 
people,” with 65% disagreeing.323  Perhaps more concerningly, an 
Axios/Survey Monkey poll from just a few months earlier found that 72% of 
respondents believed that “news sources report news they know to be fake, 
false or purposefully misleading” “[a] lot” or “sometimes,” compared to 25% 
who thought that this “rarely” or “never” occurred.324 
 
 317. Nicole Hemmer, The Conservative War on Liberal Media Has a Long 
History, ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2014/01/the-conservative-war-on-liberal-media-has-a-long-
history/283149/ [perma.cc/CG93-USEB]. 
 318. E.g., Andy Barr, Palin Trashes ‘Lamestream Media’, POLITICO (Nov. 18, 
2009), https://www.politico.com/story/2009/11/palin-trashes-lamestream-media-
029693 [perma.cc/BLF8-L77M]. 
 319. See generally Lili Levi, Real “Fake News” and Fake “Fake News”, 16 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 232 (2017). 
 320. See, e.g., Michael Crowley, The Deep State Is Real, POLITICO MAG. 
(Sept./Oct. 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/deep-state-
real-cia-fbi-intelligence-215537 [perma.cc/H4N9-LNSJ]. 
 321. Levi, supra note 319, at 248–57. 
 322. Id. at 257–62. 
 323. Eli Watkins, Poll: Majority of GOP Agrees News Media is ‘Enemy of the 
People’, CNN (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/14/politics/quinnipiac-
media-gop/index.html [perma.cc/4WFX-BCDR]. 
 324. Sara Fischer, 92% of Republicans Think Media Intentionally Reports Fake 
News, AXIOS (June 27, 2018), https://www.axios.com/trump-effect-92-percent-
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But public skepticism of media reporting – and calculated efforts by 
politicians to capitalize on that skepticism – does not end with reports of 
factual statements.  It extends to polling, too.  The American public has a 
deep-rooted skepticism about the accuracy of public opinion polls,325 and 
Donald Trump’s pronouncement that “Any negative polls are fake news” 
finds fertile ground in that skepticism.  In this context, the proliferation of fake 
polls is even more concerning.  The media lacks sufficient knowledge of 
statistical methodology to accurately report on polls in the first place,326 
rendering them vulnerable to accidentally reporting fake polls as legitimate 
ones.327  This leads to an obvious problem: If people already believe that the 
media lies and that polls are faked – even when they almost always aren’t – 
the proliferation of actually fake polls could have an even more damaging 
effect on the public’s trust in the media and polling companies by extension. 
3.  Manipulating the Democratic Process 
Many of the harms of fake polls – either as they are used right now or as 
they could be used in the future – are derived from what decades of political 
science and public opinion research has shown are the results of real polls.  




 325. Rosenstiel, infra note 329, at 711–12 (discussing public skepticism of polls). 
 326. Yosef Bhatti & Rasmus Tue Pedersen, News Reporting of Opinion Polls: 
Journalism and Statistical Noise, 28 INT’L J. OF PUB. OPINION RESEARCH 129, 130–37 
(2016) (noting failure of media outlets to accurately report on polling methodology). 
 327. In response to this vulnerability, a number of political analysts have 
developed sets of guidance for political reporters to use when reporting on polls. See 
generally, e.g., Harry Enten, How to Avoid Falling for a Fake Poll, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 
(Aug. 23, 2017, 12:24 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-to-avoid-falling-
for-a-fake-poll/ [perma.cc/C34K-A7PU]; Vicki Krueger, 5 Guidelines for Writing 
About Poll Numbers, POYNTER (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.poynter.org/educators-
students/2016/5-guidelines-for-writing-about-poll-numbers/ [perma.cc/5P6V-EJQR]; 
Brian Resnick & Nora Kelly, The Pollsters’ Guide to Reporting on Polls, ATLANTIC 
(June 16, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/the-pollsters-
guide-to-reporting-on-polls/448410/ [perma.cc/65WA-KYFD]. 
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polls,328 especially when polls project a close329 or tightening race,330 so their 
results can spread quickly.  Perhaps owing to their popularity with journalists, 
polls have real effects on elections. 
For example, public opinion polls affect turnout in elections.331  Polls 
can affect turnout positively or negatively, depending on the perceived 
closeness of the election.332  When polling predicts a close election, voter 
turnout experiences a noticeable “boost”;333 but when the opposite is true, and 
a “landslide victory is expected,” polls projecting the landslide actually 
decrease turnout.334 
Unsurprisingly, given the extent to which public opinion polls drive 
media coverage, they can also affect the viability of campaigns.  The media’s 
coverage of polls does more than just help gin up expectations of a close race 
– it also draws attention to individual candidates with a frequency that largely 
corresponds to those candidates’ standings in the polls themselves.335  Those 
 
 328. See generally Bhatti & Pedersen, supra note 326. 
 329. Tom Rosenstiel, Political Polling and the New Media Culture: A Case of 
More Being Less, PUB. OPINION Q. 698, 705 (2005) (“Polls that are outliers, diverging 
from the results of other polls, are . . . provocative and draw traffic to a news outlet, 
particularly to a Web site, where consumers who hear about a poll on TV might 
subsequently visit the site that originally published it. Controversial polls, in other 
words, can even be construed by some as good salesmanship.”); Kathleen Searles et. 
al, For Whom the Poll Airs: Comparing Poll Results to Television Poll Coverage, 80 
PUB. OPINION Q. 943, 952 (“[T]he [media] gatekeepers may be incentivized to cover 
polls that are either surprising or close.”). 
 330. Searles, supra note 329, at 957 (“Significant changes in poll margins make it 
more likely that it will air.”). 
 331. Id. 
 332. See Jens Großer & Arthur Schram, Public Opinion Polls, Voter Turnout, and 
Welfare: An Experimental Study, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 700, 714–15 (2010). This is also 
true for the kinds of election “forecasts” like FiveThirtyEight that estimate the 
likelihood that a particular candidate will win. Sean J. Westwood et al., Projecting 
Confidence: How the Probabilistic Horserace Confuses and Demobilizes the Public, 
82 J. POLITICS (forthcoming) (manuscript at 26–27) (on file with author) (noting that 
“probabilistic horserace coverage lowers perceived electoral competition, confuses 
many potential voters, and, as odds diverge from 50-50, can have demobilizing effects 
compared [to] coverage focusing on vote share” and that “forecasting and 
fundamentally alter the information environment available to potential voters, with the 
potential to change the outcome of elections”). 
 333. Id. at 714. 
 334. Id. 
 335. See, e.g., Nate Silver, Trump Boom or Trump Bubble?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 
(Dec. 15, 2015, 9:10 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/trump-boom-or-trump-
bubble/ [perma.cc/W5DD-29FA]; Jonathan Stray, How Much Influence Does the 
Media Really Have Over Elections? Digging into the Data, NIEMANLAB (Jan. 11, 
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poll results, the media attention, or both also contribute to candidate 
fundraising; candidates that do better in polls tend to raise more money.336  
Further, polls are used by national parties and the Commission on Presidential 
Debates as proxies for viability – which then determines a candidate’s ability 
to participate in a sponsored debate.337  Excluded candidates have 
understandably filed suit against the Commission for its use of polling in its 
requirements.338  Third-party presidential candidates routinely allege that the 
failure to include them in presidential debates “cause[s] them to lose access to 
television audiences and resulting campaign contributions worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars,” which is likely an accurate statement of the effects of 
debate exclusion – though not an injury redressable by courts.339  
Even less surprisingly – given that polls affect media attention, perceived 
viability, and fundraising – polls also affect election results.  To begin with, 
the Asch conformity experiments of the 1950s showed that people generally 
 
2016, 2:49 PM), https://www.niemanlab.org/2016/01/how-much-influence-does-the-
media-really-have-over-elections-digging-into-the-data/ [perma.cc/F6B2-4UAW]; 
see generally Wayne P. Stegar, Who Wins Nominations and Why? An Updated 
Forecast of the Presidential Primary Vote, 60 POLI. RESEARCH Q. 91 (2007). 
 336. Randall E. Adkins & Andrew J. Dowdle, The Money Primary: What 
Influences the Outcome of Pre-Primary Presidential Nomination Fundraising?, 32 
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES Q. 256, 263–65 (2002). 
 337. Bob Bauer, Political Parties and the Candidate Debates in the Presidential 
Nominating Process, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 590, 603–612 (2018) (discussing the use of 
polling as part of candidate debate criteria for primary debates and general election 
debates in presidential elections).  The Democratic Party’s 2020 presidential debate 
criteria establishes a binary option for candidates: “Register 1% or more support in 
three polls . . . publicly released between January 1, 2019, and 14 days prior to the 
date of the Organization Debate,” with a list of qualifying pollsters, or “by 
demonstrating that the campaign has received donations from at least (1) 65,000 
unique donors; and (2) a minimum of 200 unique donors per state in at least 20 U.S. 
states.” Press Release, Democratic Nat’l Comm., DNC Announces Details for the First 
Two Presidential Primary Debates (Feb. 14, 2019), https://democrats.org/press/dnc-
announces-details-for-the-first-two-presidential-primary-debates/ [perma.cc/2AX4-
X3E8]. 
 338. The Commission has established three criteria for presidential debate 
inclusion:  
First, the candidate had to be constitutionally eligible to be president.  
Second, he or she must have qualified to appear on “enough state ballots 
to have at least a mathematical chance of securing an Electoral College 
majority in the 2012 general election.”  And, third, the candidate had to 
have achieved a “level of support of at least 15% (fifteen percent) of the 
national electorate as determined by” averaging the most recent results of 
“five selected national public opinion polling organizations.”  
Johnson v. Comm’n on Presidential Debates, 869 F.3d 976, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2017)  
(internal citations omitted). 
 339. Id. at 981. 
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tend to conform to majority opinions and social pressure.340  This conformity 
discernibly manifests itself in public opinion too; when polls are released 
indicating the public’s view on a matter of public policy, they “can be self-
fulfilling prophecies and produce opinion cascades.”341  In other words, in 
some cases, people’s opinions on an issue can be changed when a poll is 
released showing that a majority of the public feel a certain way on that issue.  
And in the context of voting for parties and candidates, political science 
research shows the presence of a “bandwagon effect,” where voters are likelier 
to vote for perceived “winners.”342  These perceptions are at least in part 
driven by the results of public opinion polls.343  Related research has shown 
an interaction between the “bandwagon effect” and strategic voting, where 
voters, in response to polls, switch their vote from their first preference to their 
second to prevent their least-preferred choice from winning.344 
But consider for a moment that these effects – on turnout, candidate 
viability, fundraising, issues, and election results themselves – flow naturally, 
and likely unintentionally, from legitimate opinion polls.  Though some of 
these effects may be desirable by individual actors who release polls,345 there 
 
 340. See generally Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, 193 SCI. AM. 
31 (1955).  “There is, however, increasing evidence that the tendency to conform has 
declined over time.” Barry C. Edwards, Why Appeals Courts Rarely Reverse Lowers 
Courts: An Experimental Study to Explore Affirmation Bias, 68 EMORY L.J. 1035, 
1044 n.50 (2019) (internal citations omitted). 
 341. David Rothschild & Neil Malhotra, Are Public Opinion Polls Self-Fulfilling 
Prophecies?, 1 RESEARCH & POL. 1, 6 (2014).  It is worth noting, however, that these 
cascades are strongest for “issues where people seem to have the weakest pre-
treatment attitudes, the most uninformative priors of perceived public opinion, and for 
which their attitudes are not hardened by partisan predispositions.” Id. 
 342. E.g., Steven Callander, Majority Rule When Voters Like to Win, 64 GAMES 
& ECON. BEHAV. 393, 394–96 (2008); Jens Olav Dahlgaard et al., How are Voters 
Influenced by Opinion Polls? The Effect of Polls on Voting Behavior and Party 
Sympathy, 12 WORLD POL. SCI. 283, 296–99 (2016). 
 343. See generally supra note 340. 
 344. See Haldun Evrenk & Chien-Yuan Sher, Social Interactions in Voting 
Behavior: Distinguishing Between Strategic Voting and the Bandwagon Effect, 162 
PUB. CHOICE 405, 405, 421 (2015). 
 345. Pollsters may alter their results in order to get their polls on television or to 
provide campaigns and affiliated political organizations with desired results. 
Rosenstiel, supra note 329, at 703–05.  And individual campaigns may release 
misleading polling data, often in the form of a so-called “informed ballot,” polls 
showing a close election in order to attract financial contributions and to boost turnout, 
or even flood unscientific online polls in order to build a narrative that their campaign 
has momentum. See Stuart Rothenberg, I Never Read ‘Informed Ballots.’ You 
Shouldn’t Either, INSIDE ELECTIONS (Oct. 11, 2005, 11:47 PM), 
https://www.insideelections.com/news/article/i-never-read-informed-ballots.-you-
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is no widespread effort to manipulate elections by releasing fraudulent polls 
– for now.  But considering the exhaustive efforts undertaken by Russian 
intelligence services in the 2016 elections to sow discord and undermine the 
integrity of American democracy,346 it is not hard to imagine a similar effort 
using fake polls. 
B.  Weaponizing Fake Polls 
After more than a century of the United States meddling in the 
democratic elections of other countries,347 it became a victim of its own 
success with the Russian government’s successful interference in the 2016 
elections.  Though the extent of the Russian interference is not fully known – 
and given the classified nature of the information, it may not be fully known 
for a while, if ever348 – it is clear that the Russian government’s efforts were 
extensive.  Hackers supported by the Russian government hacked into the 
Clinton campaign’s emails,349 internal Democratic National Committee 
correspondence and data,350 and confidential documents belonging to the 
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and the campaigns of 
Democratic congressional candidates.351 
 
shouldnt-either [perma.cc/NY2D-NZ8B]; Michael Rothfield et al., Cohen Hired IT 
Firm to Rig Early CNBC, Drudge Polls to Favor Trump, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17, 2019, 
6:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/poll-rigging-for-trump-and-creating-
womenforcohen-one-it-firms-work-order-11547722801 [perma.cc/PCY6-3F8V]; 
e.g., Simone Pathé, One Candidate’s Positive Poll Is Another’s Fundraising Boon, 
ROLL CALL (July 14, 2016, 6:35 PM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/one-
candidates-positive-poll-anothers-fundraising-boon [perma.cc/HH2X-VBZ3]. 
 346. See generally, OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, ICA 2017-01D, 
Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections”: 
The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution (2017), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf [perma.cc/CL9H-S8ZH]. 
 347. Ishaan Tharoor, The Long History of the U.S. Interfering with Elections 
Elsewhere, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/13/the-long-history-of-the-u-s-interfering-with-
elections-elsewhere/?utm_term=.e623ba19be84 [perma.cc/4ZBN-ATA7]. 
 348. Natasha Bertrand, Even Congress Might Not Get the Full Mueller Report, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/03/
what-has-happen-muellers-report-become-public/586060/ [perma.cc/MW2F-XU8V]. 
 349. Ido Kilovaty, Doxfare: Politically Motivated Leaks and the Future of the 
Norm on Non-Intervention in the Era of Weaponized Information, 9 HARV. NAT’L SEC. 
J. 149, 156–57 (2018). 
 350. Id. at 154–56 
 351. Dan Efrony & Yuval Shany, A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 
on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice, 112 A.J.I.L. 583, 616 (2018); Eric 
Lipton & Scott Shane, Democratic House Candidates Were Also Targets of Russian 
Hacking, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/
politics/house-democrats-hacking-dccc.html [perma.cc/92XK-GLGJ]; see generally 
Indictment, United States v. Netyksho, Case No. 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ (D.D.C. July 13, 
2018), available at https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/80-netyksho-et-al-
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Of course, some political campaigns benefited from and used the fruits 
of the Russian government’s hacking, which maximized its impact352 – 
regardless of whether “collusion” could be legally established.  Republican 
candidates and organizations – like the National Republican Congressional 
Committee, the campaign arm of House Republicans – embraced the hacked 
information and used it against Democratic congressional candidates, even 
after House Democrats declared that doing so would make House Republicans 
“complicit in aiding the Russian government in its effort to influence 
American elections.”353  Officials affiliated with the Trump campaign 
seemingly coordinated with Russian-affiliated hackers to schedule document 
drops,354 and Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort apparently shared 
polling data with Konstanin Kilimnik, a Russian political consultant with 
close ties to his country’s intelligence services.355 
But Russian intelligence services played a more active role than just 
hacking information and leaking it.  They also organized active online efforts 
to weaponize the hacked information against its victims.356  The Russian-
affiliated users started Facebook groups – which disseminated en masse 
carefully crafted messages meant to increase Trump’s support in the election 
– and planned protests and other events in the United States, which were 




 352. Lipton & Shane, supra note 351 (noting that Republican candidates and 
Republican-affiliated organizations used the documents hacked and leaked by 
Russian-affiliated hackers in their 2016 campaigns). 
 353. Id. 
 354. See Rosalind S. Helderman, Roger Stone was in Close Contact with Trump 
Campaign About Wikileaks, Indictment Shows, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/roger-stone-was-in-close-contact-with-
trump-campaign-about-wikileaks-indictment-shows/2019/01/25/65d9ad1a-20a2-
11e9-8e21-59a09ff1e2a1_story.html?utm_term=.d612326dc102; see generally 
Indictment, United States v. Roger Stone, Case No. 1:19-cr-00018-ABJ (D.D.C. Jan. 
24, 2019), available at https://www.justice.gov/file/1124706/download. 
 355. Rachel Weiner et al., Paul Manafort Shared 2016 Polling Data with Russian 





 356. Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, The Plot to Subvert an Election, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-
interference-election-trump-clinton.html [perma.cc/B6ET-UDBX]. 
 357. Id. 
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The scope of the Russian government’s efforts – which are certainly not 
exhaustively documented here – demonstrate the harm that could come from 
weaponizing fake polls.  What would stop the Russian government, for 
example, from starting and funding a polling agency designed to release fake 
polls?  Their 2016 interference reflects a keen understanding of American 
politics, so given the obsession that American political journalists have with 
polls and that prognosticators have with poll aggregators like 
RealClearPolitics and FiveThirtyEight, this would be a logical, if chilling, 
step forward.  The fake polls published in 2017 and 2018, which were 
apparently designed to affect PredictIt markets, were amateurish and easily 
uncovered as fraudulent.358  But what would happen if unscrupulous 
manipulators, with more nuance and funds at their disposal, decided to do the 
same?  They could play a long game by starting a polling firm that actually 
conducts polls, perfects the art of polling accuracy, cultivates respect from 
political analysts . . . and then changes course.  The respected polling firm 
could then fake its numbers to boost the chances of favored candidates, 
confound polling averages, and alter expectations.  And why stop with just 
one polling shop?  Why not more?  A single poll, even from a well-regarded 
pollster, can be recognized as an outlier,359 but with confirmation from other 
pollsters, the narrative of a race can start to shift.  And almost all of this would 
be undetectable, absent focused attention and a hearty supply of subpoenas. 
The harms don’t stop with foreign interference.  What would stop 
similarly unscrupulous candidates from doing the same?  Candidates already 
rely on misleading polls to attract fundraising support and to drive a narrative 
that they can win – but only if you, like-minded voter, turn out!  What would 
stop them from faking a poll, then?  
2019 might have seen the first instance of a candidate doing so.  In 
March, Jacksonville mayoral candidate Anna Brosche’s campaign began 
pushing a poll purportedly from Gravis Marketing to argue that she had a 
chance in the upcoming election.360  But Gravis had not conducted that poll – 
or any other for the mayoral race.361  Brosche responded by filing a complaint 
with Florida Attorney General Ashley Moody’s office, which referred the 
matter to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.362  Though Brosche 
ended up losing the election, the poll ended up being pretty close to the mark, 
 
 358. Enten, supra note 11. 
 359. See Nate Silver, Outlier Polls Are No Substitute for News, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 
(June 20, 2012, 6:37 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/outlier-polls-are-no-
substitute-for-news/ [perma.cc/SQ2J-EEDC]. 
 360. Peter Schorsch, Sham Survey: Gravis Marketing’s Jacksonville Mayoral 
Race Poll a Fraud, FLA. POL. (Mar. 16, 2019), 
https://floridapolitics.com/archives/291085-sham-survey-gravis-jacksonville-mayor-
poll-a-fraud [perma.cc/8X6V-WGPC]. 
 361. Id. 
 362. A.G. Gancarski, Gravis-gate: FDLE Still Looking at Fake Jacksonville Poll, 
FLA. POL. (Mar. 27, 2019), https://floridapolitics.com/archives/291968-gravis-gate-
fdle-still-looking-at-fake-jacksonville-poll [perma.cc/H4D3-UNUN]. 
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and she closed her campaign by arguing that she was the victim of untoward 
election interference.363 
In the event that a candidate uses a fake poll to solicit campaign 
contributions, a prosecution for wire fraud would be without helpful precedent 
– unlike a prosecution for foreign manipulation, of which there is now 
plenty.364  Admittedly, federal prosecutions dating back to Watergate have 
certainly targeted the operators of “scam political action committees” – which 
convince contributors that “the money [they] raise[] will go to help or defeat 
[a] candidate” but actually funnel the contributions to the corrupt political 
operatives running them.365  But those prosecutions are uncommon and 
usually are based on “fraudulent misrepresentation” under the 1974 
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act.366  Prosecutions against 
candidates themselves for fraudulent solicitation of campaign funds are 
certainly unheard of outside of the context of bribery367 or unreported 
contributions.368  Some federal prosecutors have successfully alleged – and 
courts have at least sometimes upheld – mail and wire fraud violations for 
 
 363. Id.  The FDLE’s investigation is ongoing, and though there is no evidence 
that Brosche’s campaign was anything other than the victim of manipulation, the 
results of the investigation should yield more facts. 
 364. See generally Indictment, United States v. Netyksho, Case No. 1:18-cr-




 365. Matthew S. Raymer, Fraudulent Political Fundraising in the Age of Super 
PACs, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 239, 240 (2016); see also George S. Scoville III, Note, 
Curtailing the Cudgel of “Coordination” by Curing Confusion: How States Can Fix 
What the Feds Got Wrong on Campaign Finance, 48 U. MEM. L. REV. 463, 495–97 
(2017) (discussing scam PACs). 
 366. See Raymer, supra note 365, at 245–63; but see United States v. Curry, 681 
F.2d 406, 410–16 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding sufficient evidence of wire fraud for 
improprieties in running political action committee); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Fraudulent Political Action Committee Operator Sentenced to Two Years in 
Prison (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/fraudulent-political-
action-committee-operator-sentenced-two-years-prison [perma.cc/7QPG-9ETQ] 
(noting that the defendant pled guilty “to one count of conspiracy to commit wire 
fraud.”). 
 367. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, A Theory of Bribery, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 
1950 (2017). 
 368. E.g., Anthony J. Gaughan, The Case for Limiting Federal Criminal 
Jurisdiction over State and Local Campaign Contributions, 65 ARK. L. REV. 587, 615–
17 (2012) (discussing John Edwards’s unsuccessful prosecution for accepting what 
federal prosecutors characterized as an illegal campaign contribution that his 
campaign did not report). 
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“what federal prosecutors view as ‘corrupt’ campaign contributions,” based 
on a theory of honest services fraud.369  Presumably, honest services fraud 
could extend to a campaign that solicits contributions based on a fraudulent 
poll, but given the significant cutback to the doctrine since the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Skilling v. United States, such a prosecution may sit on 
weak ground.370 
These dual risks – that foreign governments can use fake polls to 
undermine American democracy and that candidates can use them to enhance 
their own standing – come with different harms, but avoiding both is desirable.  
With the existential threats to democracy posed by gerrymandering, 
SuperPACs, legalized bribery following the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
McDonnell v. United States, and more,371 American democracy can hardly 
stand to be even further undermined.  
C.  Justifying Criminal Liability 
Historically, there have been few instances in which criminal law has 
been available as a means of protecting the basic integrity of American 
democracy.  Though most agree that one of the most basic functions of 
criminal law is to protect civil society,372 few would go so far as to posit that 
another, related function is to protect democratic society.  Indeed, criminal 
law was largely inapplicable to election conduct until the late nineteenth 
century, when the first federal and state efforts to clean up elections were 
passed.373  Prior to this, the only “regulation” came in the form of political 
efforts, like election contests filed with the U.S. House of Representatives, 
which were woefully inadequate.374 
 
 369. See generally Curry, 681 F.2d at 411; Gaughan, supra note 368. 
 370. Id. at 603. 
 371. See generally Michael Kent Curtis & Eugene D. Mazo, Campaign Finance 
and the Ecology of Democratic Speech, 103 KY. L.J.K 529 (2014–15); Richard H. 
Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28 
(2004); Eugene Temchenko, Note, A First Amendment Right to Corrupt Your 
Politician, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 465 (2018). 
 372. See Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in 
Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1486, 1549–55 (2016) (“The state in the criminal 
context should be the embodiment and protector of society’s lived moral culture – its 
way of life.”). 
 373. Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Voter Fraud or Voter Defrauded? Highlighting 
an Inconsistent Consideration of Election Fraud, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9 
(2009) (discussing federal efforts to criminalize and ban election fraud); Richard A. 
Schurr, Note, Burson v. Freeman: Where the Right to Vote Intersects with the 
Freedom to Speak, 15 WHITTIER L. REV. 869, 890–91 (1994) (discussing state-level 
efforts to ban election fraud). 
 374. Sean J. Wright, The Origin of Disputed Elections: Case Studies of Early 
American Contested Congressional Elections, 81 ALB. L. REV. 609, 624–46 
(2017/2018) (describing early nineteenth-century procedures for contesting elections 
and providing case studies).  During this time period – and even before, in colonial 
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In many ways, little is different today.  The progress made during the 
Civil Rights Era to protect the integrity of elections by expanding the franchise 
to all eligible voters was quickly followed by a greater use of the criminal law 
to block access to that franchise.375  Today, the most notable intersection of 
criminal and election law is to block those who have been imprisoned from 
casting ballots376 and to criminally prosecute those who do vote, even 
accidentally.377  Meanwhile, the greatest opportunities to use the criminal law 
to protect the franchise have not been fully utilized.  Though the U.S. Code is 
ripe with sections that criminalize election-related activities,378 the 
enforcement of these crimes has been minimal.  The FEC, for example, rarely 
refers election violations for criminal prosecution379 and, due at least in part 
to gridlock,380 rarely even pursues civil enforcement actions.381  And the 
Supreme Court struck a serious blow to corruption prosecutions with its 
holding in McDonnell,382 the results of which have already been felt.383 
This asymmetric failure – the enforcement of criminal laws to narrow 
the franchise and the non-enforcement of criminal laws that seek to protect it 
 
times – election fraud certainly occurred, but legal historians disagree about its 
frequency. See generally TRACY CAMPBELL, DELIVER THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF 
ELECTION FRAUD, AN AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION – 1742–2004 (2006), see also, 
Dayna L. Cunningham, Who Are to Be the Electors? A Reflection on the History of 
Voter Registration in the United States, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 370, 380–85 (1991). 
 375. See Friedrichs Benson, supra note 373, at 9–12. 
 376. See generally Note, One Person, No Vote: The Laws of Felon 
Disenfranchisement, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1939 (2002). 
 377. E.g., Sandra E. Garcia, Texas Woman Sentenced to 5 Years in Prison for 
Voter Fraud Loses Bid for New Trial, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/13/us/texas-woman-voter-fraud.html 
[perma.cc/4QLK-E9DV]. 
 378. The Department of Justice divides these crimes into election fraud, patronage 
crimes, and campaign financing crimes. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL 
PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES 2–4 (8th ed. 2017). 
 379. Kenneth P. Doyle, FEC Rarely Votes to Refer Criminal Cases to Justice, 
BLOOMBERG L. (July 29, 2015), https://www.bna.com/fec-rarely-votes-
n17179934048/ [perma.cc/YJZ3-SXA9]. 
 380. See Pichaya P. Winichakul, Note, The Missing Structural Debate: Reforming 
Disclosure of Online Political Communications, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1388, 1399–1403 
(2018). 
 381. See, e.g., Michael W. Carroll, Note, When Congress Just Says No: 
Deterrence Theory and the Inadequate Enforcement of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act, 84 GEO. L.J. 551, 554–63 (1996). 
 382. See generally Khadija Lalani, McDonnell v. United States: Legalized 
Corruption and the Need for Statutory Reform, 113 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 29 (2018). 
 383. Joshua S. Sellers, Contributions, Bribes, and the Convergence of Political 
and Criminal Corruption, 45 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 657, 698–702 (2018). 
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– comes at a time when the criminal law could be used more than ever to 
protect elections.  Reports authorized by American intelligence agencies and 
the fruits of Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation have revealed the 
extent to which Russian agents interfered in American elections.384  
Candidates, party organizations, and even state registration systems were 
hacked, and the proceeds of these hacks leaked to the benefit of domestic 
political actors.385  These efforts show no signs of halting,386 and the Trump 
Administration’s sluggish response to the problem of protecting election 
administration through robust cybersecurity efforts certainly doesn’t help.387 
It is in this vein that this Article suggests a straightforward way to use 
the criminal law to protect the integrity of American elections: federal 
prosecutions for the distribution of fake polls.388  This is, admittedly, a bold 
solution, given that the fraudulent activity at issue in this Article may not 
ordinarily justify federal jurisdiction.  After all, the loss amount – actual or 
anticipated – here likely does not exceed several thousand dollars, in contrast 
to the substantially larger loss amounts usually seen in federal fraud cases.389  
 
 384. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN 
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2019 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2019), 
https://cdn.cnn.com/cnn/2019/images/04/18/mueller-report-searchable.pdf 
[perma.cc/8EV4-ZY5P]. 
 385. Id. 
 386. See Patricia Zengerle & Doina Chiacu, U.S. 2018 Elections ‘Under Attack’ 




 387. See David P. Fidler, Transforming Election Cybersecurity, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. (May 17, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/report/transforming-election-
cybersecurity [perma.cc/2CSJ-68E8]; Paul Rosenzweig et al., Next Steps for U.S. 
Cybersecurity in the Trump Administration: Active Cyber Defense, THE HERITAGE 
FOUND. (May 5, 2017), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-
05/BG3188.pdf [perma.cc/G7WS-SPJ2]. 
 388. While 2020 presidential candidates have been sluggish to address digital 
disinformation outside of broad strokes, Elizabeth Warren recently released a plan to 
“fight[] digital disinformation.”  Her plan specifically calls for the creation of “civil 
and criminal penalties for knowingly disseminating false information about when and 
how to vote in U.S. elections.” Fighting Digital Disinformation, WARREN FOR 
PRESIDENT, https://elizabethwarren.com/plans/fighting-digital-disinformation 
[perma.cc/ZH87-ZTRW] (last visited Jan. 29, 2020); Cristiano Lima, How Warren 
Would Fight Election Disinformation, POLITICO (Jan. 29, 2020, 11:08 AM EST), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/29/warren-plan-election-disinformation-
2020-108854 [perma.cc/QP97-RPUA].  The proposal outlined by this Article 
comfortably fits with Warren’s plan. 
 389. E.g., Glenn R. Schmitt & Cassandra Syckes, Overview of Federal Criminal 
Cases – Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 11 (2018), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2018/FY17_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf [perma.cc/LK5A-
7V6A] (“The losses in [federal fraud] cases [in 2017] ranged from no loss (in 170 
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Indeed, any U.S. Attorney’s Office presented with the possibility of pursuing 
these charges would likely find that the loss amount falls below the “generally 
applicable minimum thresholds” in their internal prosecution guidelines.390 
But in any event, federal prosecution would be appropriate given the 
facts of the case.  Though the individual losses were – or would be – very 
small, they would likely be spread out over a large, national range, which 
would prevent a state prosecutor from effectively bringing charges.391  So 
perhaps counterintuitively, because the loss amount is so small, “federal 
prosecution would be appropriate not only because of state inability to deal 
with the situation, but because the abuse of the [wires] is an inherent element 
of the scheme.”392 
In this case, prosecution would serve a strong federal interest.  The 
interest at stake is weightier than concerns over how fake polls can shade the 
accuracy of an academic endeavor in prediction markets.  It is instead to deter 
other wrongdoers, the sort who would weaponize fake polls to manipulate 
elections.  Though the statutory theories that may lead to criminal liability for 
the publishers of these fake polls may not lead to similar liability for other 
publishers, like foreign governments and campaigns, deterring this sort of 
fraud before it can happen – and raising awareness of it – is vital. 
CONCLUSION 
The fake polls that have been created and distributed to online political 
betting markets seemingly represent just another routine use of fraud to make 
a quick buck.  And in many ways, this is true.  But to other, far more malicious 
 
cases) to more than $8 billion (one case), with an average loss amount of $6,100,603 
and a median loss amount of $246,553.”); but see Stephen F. Smith, Federalization’s 
Folly, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 31, 52 n.81 (2019) (“With a ‘median loss amount of 
$246,553,’ it is clear that many involved fairly small losses to victims. Indeed, almost 
a quarter (23.7%) of fraud defendants were not required to pay any restitution.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 390. Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1142 (2004).  
These specific thresholds, as well as the internal guidelines more generally, are not 
publicly available, but usually differ depending on the U.S. Attorney’s office in 
question and the volume of cases it handles. Patrick E. Corbett, Prosecution Responses 
to Internet Victimization: Prosecuting the Internet Fraud Case Without Going Broke, 
76 MISS. L.J. 841, 863–64, 864 n.90 (2007). 
 391. Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American 
Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1140–45 (1995). 
 392. L.B. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors’ Discretion, 
13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 64, 73–75 (1948).  Of course, this justification was, at 
least historically, predicated on mail, not wire, fraud, because abuse of the mails was 
an abuse of a “federally supported means of communication.” Id. at 74. 
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actors, they could represent something more enticing – an opportunity to 
disrupt American elections as a means of achieving a foreign policy objective 
or for personal political gain.  At first blush, these threats may seem 
unimaginable and unrealistic.  However, with the benefit of hindsight and a 
more thorough understanding of the successful election interference in 2016 
by Russian intelligence forces, these threats should be taken seriously by 
federal prosecutors.  The consequences of fake polls are quite real – and so, 
too, should be their punishment. 
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